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This article complements a previous one entitled Choice of Law
Rules in North Carolina.' The purpose here is to examine the conflicts
rules and other legal principles immediately pertinent to the resolution
of problems of recognition and enforcement of sister-state and foreign
judgments in North Carolina.
I. RECOGNITION OF SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTS
1. Full Faith and Credit
The constitutional mandate that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State' 2 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in
tProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This article was prepared in
cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
'Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REV. 243 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Wurfel].
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
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litigation arising in North Carolina. In Kovacs v. Brewer3 the Supreme
Court held that once jurisdiction is established, full faith and credit must
be given even to custody or support decrees of a sister state unless there
is a clear finding of subsequent change of circumstances warranting a
new disposition. That the full faith and credit clause does not preclude
forum courts from re-examining findings of jurisdictional fact made in
ex parte judicial proceedings in a sister state was recognized in Williams
v. North Carolina.4 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has clearly
enunciated its obligation to give full faith and credit to the final judg-
ments of sister states. 5
Full faith and credit must be given by state courts to final federal
3356 U.S. 604 (1958), vacating and remanding 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957). See Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Moreover, normally a forum court is without power to modify a
judgment duly entered in a court of competent jurisdiction in another state. Laughridge v. Lovejoy,
234 N.C. 663, 68 S.E.2d 403 (195 1). The limitation on this latter rule is well stated in In re Kluttz,
7 N.C. App. 383, 385, 172 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1970):
The Full Faith and'Credit Clause. . . does not conclusively bind the North Caro-
lina courts to give greater effect to a decree of another state than it has in that state, or
to treat as final and conclusive an order of a sister state which is interlocutory in
nature. . . . When an order for custody has been entered by a court in another state, a
court of this state may, upon gaining jurisdiction, and upon showing of changed circum-
stances, enter a new order.
Cases reflecting the custody-awarding powers of North Carolina courts in multistate situations
are collected and discussed in Wurfel, 299-305. See also Webb v. Friedberg, 189 N.C. 166, 126 S.E.
508 (1925).
4325 U.S. 226 (1945), affg 224 N.C. 183, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944). Williams and some of the
subsequent federally considered divorce cases limiting its application by broad use of the resjudicata
doctrine are examined in Wurfel, 293-97. For three entertaining and instructive accounts of the legal
lore generated by Williams, see Baer, So Your Client Wants A Divorce!, 24 N.C.L. REv. I (1945);
Baer, The Aftermath of Williams vs. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REv. 265 (1950); Baer, The Law
of Divorce Fifteen Years After Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. REv. 265 (1958). See also
Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 540, 167 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1969). Cf. Irby v. Wilson, 21
N.C. 568 (1837). Irby held that a purported Tennessee decree of divorce, granted to the husband
on service by publication six years after the wife had removed to North Carolina, was a nullity
and, hence, that the wife's purported remarriage before the death of the Tennessee husband was
void. The court said:
IT]he decree of the Court of Tennessee is altogether inoperative and null, because it was
not an adjudication between any parties; since the wife did not appear in the suit, nor
was served with process, and was not a subject of Tennessee, but was a citizen and
inhabitant of this State, and therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of Tennessee, nor
amenable to her tribunals.
Id. at 576.
5Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397 (1966); Crescent Hat Co.
v. Chizak, 223 N.C. 371, 26 S.E.2d 871 (1943).
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court judgments' and by federal courts to final state-court judgments.7
A final judgment of a federal district court must be given full faith and
credit in all other federal courts.'
A federal statute permits final money or property judgments of any
federal district court to be registered in and directly enforced by any
other federal district court;9 a comparable statute applies to Court of
Claims judgments in favor of the United States. 10 The mandate of a
federal district court injunction runs throughout the United States."
Accordingly, occasion to resort to state-court action to enforce a federal
judgment or injunction is rare.
The fundamental rule that a judgment of a sister state may not be
directly executed but must be sued upon and reduced to judgment in the
jurisdiction in which execution is sought received early recogntion in
6Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 105
S.E.2d 655 (1958); Jocie Motor Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E.2d 388 (1950); Yerys
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 442, 187 S.E. 583 (1936); Pigot v. Davis, 10 N.C. 25, 27
(1824). See Swope v. St. Mary Parish School Bd., 256 La. 1110, 241 So. 2d 238 (1970).
TAngel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating
Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Miller v. Barnwell Bros., 137 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1943); Resolute Ins.
Co. v. North Carolina, 276 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.C. 1967), affd, 397 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968); Cobb v. Clark, 257 F. Supp. 175 (M.D.N.C. 1966), affd per curiam,
375 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1967); Manning v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 615
(W.D.N.C. 1964); Maager v. Hoye, 122 F. Supp. 932 (W.D.N.C. 1954).
'Ferguson v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., 252 F. 705 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 570
(1918). Plaintiff lumber company brought a quiet-title action in the Federal District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina relying on title derived from an 1899 final judgment of the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee holding that the land in question was
in Tennessee and not in North Carolina. In subsequent litigation between the States of North
Carolina and Tennessee the Supreme Court determined that this land was in fact in North Carolina
and not in Tennessee. In affirming the judgment of the District Court quieting plaintiff's title, the
Court of Appeals said:
[O]ne who claims title to. . . land under a grant from one state as land situated in that
state, may sue to recover it from citizens of another state who claim under a grant from
that other state, in the United States courts of the first state, and have the title finally
adjudicated by that court.
Id. at 707.
[T]he decree adjudging valid. . . title under which it claims, having been rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, must receive. . . full faith and credit.
Id. at 7 10. See also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
928 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970). See Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 IowA L. REv.
285 (1957).
'28 U.S.C. § 2508 (1970).
"Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
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North Carolina. 12 The full faith and credit clause does not require a sister
state to apply the same procedural remedies permitted by the original
judgment-rendering state when executing its own subsequent judgment
predicated upon the earlier judgment. The Supreme Court reaffirmed
this principle in Williams.
In Williams the Supreme Court remarked generally that "a judg-
ment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in every other State, but
only if the court of the first State had . . . jurisdiction . . . to render
the judgment."' 13 In elaborating upon this rule, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina succinctly noted: "Ordinarily, the judgment of a sister
state may be collaterally attacked upon the following grounds: (i) lack
of jurisdiction; (2) fraud in the procurement; or (3) that it is against
public policy."' 4 Each of these three grounds will be considered sepa-
rately.
2. Jurisdictional Facts
Which jurisdictional facts remain open to collateral attack in de-
fense of a suit brought on a sister state judgment? In 1928 the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Coble"5 upheld a
Chicago Municipal Court judgment entered upon a warrant of attorney
to confess judgment. In so doing, the court observed:
The defendant . . . may defeat recovery . . . by showing want of
jurisdiction either as to the subject-matter or as to the person of the
defendant ...
With respect to . . . jurisdiction of the subject-matter . . . in an
action brought on a judgment rendered in another State there arises a
presumption of jurisdiction, which of course is subject to rebuttal, if
the judgment be that of a court of general jurisdiction. 6
12McLure v. Benceni, 37 N.C. 513 (1843). Accord, Reid v. Bristol, 241 N.C. 699, 86 S.E.2d
417 (1955). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971 ) states: "The local law of
the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced." However,
such methods cannot be made so complex and expensive as to make enforcement of sister-state
judgments unduly difficult. Broderick v. Bosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
"sWilliams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). Accord, Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S.
183 (1901); First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966).
"Howland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 531, 58 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1950), cited in Thrasher v.
Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 540, 167 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1969).
15195 N.C. 491, 142 S.E. 772 (1928).
61d. at 494-95, 142 S.E. at 774. See In re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 64 S.E.2d 848 (1951);
Howland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 58 S.E.2d 104 (1950).
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The court also said:
"[T]he fact that a judgment of a court of another state was entered
under a warrant of attorney to confess judgment . . . and without
service of process or appearance other than that pursuant to the war-
rant itself, does not take it out of the full faith and credit provision of
the Federal Constitution . . . . And this is true whether or not such
judgments . . . are permitted in the State in which the judgment of the
sister State is asserted."
7
Thus, the legal effect of jurisdictional facts is to be determined by apply-
ing the law of the original judgment-granting state, subject only to fed-
eral due process requirements.' 8 Only the jurisdictional facts themselves
may be redetermined by the second state court. 9
3. Widening Concepts of Jurisdiction over the Person
In 1966 the North Carolina Supreme Court extended these estab-
lished jurisdictional principles to a New York judgment predicated upon
personal service in North Carolina under a New York long-arm stat-
ute.2" The New York judgment had been by default in favor of a New
York resident against a North Carolina corporation. 2t It was stipulated
that the original cause of action arose in New York and that no part of
the New York judgment had been paid. In the North Carolina suit the
plaintiff introduced a certified copy of the New York judgment and
rested. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit, find-
ing that "'no personal service of process upon the defendant has ever
been made within the territorial jurisdiction of. . . New York, and that
195 N.C. at 494, 142 S.E. at 774, quoting Egley v. T.B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145
N.E. 830 (1924); accord, Federal Land Bank v. Garman, 220 N.C. 585, 18 S.E.2d 182 (1942).
"Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523,
146 S.E.2d 397 (1965); Dansby v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 127, 183 S.E. 521
(1936); In re Osborne, 205 N.C. 716, 172 S.E. 491 (1933); Monarch Refrig. Co. v. Farmer's Peanut
Co., 74 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 732 (1935); Maager v. Hoye, 122 F. Supp. 932
(E.D.N.C. 1954). In American Inst. of Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Willard Realty Co., 8 N.C. App. 43,
173 S.E.2d 519 (1970), the court upheld a Missouri magistrate-court judgment against a North
Carolina corporation based upon service in Missouri upon an agent designated by a clause of a
contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant. In doing so, the court looked first to
the effect given by Missouri law to such service and then to federal authority to determine whether
the Missouri rule constituted due process of law.
"Hill v. Mendenhall, 88 U.S. 543 (1874); Davis v. Bessemer City Cotton Mills, 178 F. 784
(1910); Davidson v. Sharpe, 28 N.C. 14 (1845).
2T'homas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397 (1966).
"Id. at 524, 146 S.E.2d at 398-99.
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the judgment rendered . . . without such service of process is not entitled
to recognition in the courts . . . of North Carolina under the full faith
and credit clause .... , ,22 The North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
There is a decided trend in favor of in personai jurisdiction based on
substituted service or personal service beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the forum state. Most of the states have by statute so provided
in certain circumstances, and the courts have held that such statutes
do not violate due process; this is especially true in actions against
foreign corporations. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) stated:
". .. recently in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
[1945], the Court decided that 'due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in persona?, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".' ..
The fact that defendant, a North Carolina corporation, was served
with process beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the New York court
is not, nothing else appearing, sufficient to establish a want ofjurisdic-
tion of defendant by the New York court, as against the principle that
jurisdiction will be presumed until the contrary is shown. The validity
and ejj ct of a judgment of another state nust be determined by the
laws of that state. . . . The defendant will have the opportunity. . .
to show, if it can, from the proceedings had in the New York court
and the laws of that state that there was no legal and valid service of
process.?3
Thus, North Carolina accepts the validity of personal jurisdiction as-
serted by long-arm statutes predicated upon relevant activity by the
defendant within the judgment-rendering state. In light of the McGee"'
and International Shoe Co.2 decisions, this result appears to conform
to federal mandate.
The present trend is to maximize the reach of long-arm jurisdiction
22d. at 525, 146 S.E.2d at 399.
23Id. at 526-27, 146 S.E.2d at 400-01 (emphasis added). Accord, Voliva v. Richmond Cedar
Works, 152 N.C. 656, 68 S.E. 200 (1910); Bennett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 152 N.C. 671, 68
S.E. 202 (1910).
24355 U.S. 220 (1957).
-326 U.S. 310 (1945). Two North Carolina decisions relied on McGee and International Shoe
Co. in upholding personal jurisdiction exercised over nonresident foreign corporations, based upon
substituted service of process, and predicated solely upon the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
[Vol. 50
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both by the language used in such statutes2" and by judicial interpretation
thereof. Thus, the Hawaiian statute has been held to confer personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident English corporation by service made on
it in England, despite the express realization that the enforcement forum
of such a judgment would probably be the court of a foreign country
not bound by our domestic full faith and credit obligations.27 North
Carolina courts would be obliged to give full faith and credit to this
Hawaiian judgment, subject to the possibility of certiorari review by the
Supreme Court of the United States on the issue of due process. 2 This
obligation exists even though the North Carolina Supreme Court might
145(a)(1) (1965). Section 55-145 extends to "any cause of action arising . . . out of any contract
made in this State or to be performed in this State." These decisions were Goldman v. Parkland
of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970), and Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.,
265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
2'CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1971) (effective July 1, 1970)provides: "A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." The Comment of the Judicial Council which accompanies this
§ states:
All the recognized bases of judicial jurisdiction are included. In the case of natural
persons, such bases currently include presence, domicil, residence, citizenship, consent,
appearance, doing business in a state, doing an act in a state, causing an effect in a state
by an act or omission elsewhere, use or possession of a thing in a state as well as other
relationships to a state ....
In the case of corporations and unincorporated associations (including partner-
ships), such bases currently include incorporation or organization in a state, consent,
appointment of an agent, appearance, doing business in a state, doing an act in a state,
causing an effect in a state by an act or omission elsewhere, ownership, use or possession
of a thing in a state, and other relationships to a state.
See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction in California: A 1970 License to do Whatever's Right, I
PAC. L.J. 671-94 (1970). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93-2701, Rule 4B (Supp. Vol. 7, 1971); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 301 (McKinney Supp. 1970-
71); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-22 to -28 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1971-
72); Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 1970 UTAH L. REV.
222.
, Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). Negligent manu-
facture in England by Duple, an English corporation, resulting in injury in Hawaii constituted
commission of a tortious act within Hawaii under Hawaii's long-arm statute. Duple was held
subject to the court's jurisdiction. The court recognized, however, that
problems of full faith and credit do indeed exist and enforcement in England of any
judgment appellees may secure in Hawaii may well prove difficult if the views of English
courts do not coincide with ours as to what is fair and just and in the best interests of
foreign trade. This does not, however, relieve us of our obligation to deal with these
problems in the light of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States as we
view them.
Id. at 235-36.
2"Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523, 527, 146 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1966).
1971]
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feel that the jurisdictional facts found would not meet the requirements
of the North Carolina long-arm statute. 9 The decisive inquiry is whether
those facts meet the requirements of the Hawaiian statute.
State long-arm statutes that spell out the circumstances in which
personal jurisdiction may be exercised upon substituted service in effect
impose their own limitations upon the power of the court to exercise
judicial jurisdiction by excluding those circumstances not expressly de-
fined by the statute. Consequently, a plaintiff must overcome this first
hurdle of establishing a statutory basis for jurisdiction before reaching
the federal test of whether the personal jurisdiction granted by the statute
meets minimum due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment.30 The California statute, which provides that "a court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of this state or of the United States,' ' 3 eliminates the first obstacle
and appropriately adopts the second as its determining factor.
Foreign divorce, support, and custody decrees provide the other
primary area for the contest of personal jurisdiction. The relevant North
Carolina cases were reviewed in a prior article32 and will not be reconsi-
dered here.
Once jurisdiction of the person has been obtained, it continues
through all subsequent proceedings arising ancillary to the original cause
of action, even though the party is a nonresident. This jurisdiction is
subject to reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard at each new
step in the proceeding. 33 North Carolina Courts have applied this rule.
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969). For an examination of recent North Carolina legislation
regarding service of process outside the state see Louis, Modern Statutory Approaches To Service
of Process Outside The State-Comparing the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure With The
Uniform Interstate And International Procedure Act, 49 N.C.L. REv. 235 (197 1).
0See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note §§ 24-79, at 102
(1971):
Whether a state has empowered one of its courts to act in a certain case depends
upon the local law of that state. The same law determines the effect of any action that
the court may take in excess of its authority. If under this law sucli action in the
particular case does no more than make the judgment erroneous and subject to reversal
on appeal, the judgment, so long as it remains unreversed, will be recognized as valid in
other states; among States of the United States, this result is required by the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution. On the other hand, if under the local law of the
state of rendition the judgment is void and subject to collateral attack, it will so be treated
everywhere.
3'CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1971).
32Wurfel 294-305.




In Hinnant v. Hinnant4 the court stated:
The defendant [now stationed at Shaw Field, Sumter, South Caro-
lina] was personally served with summons in the original action insti-
tuted in 1953 in Robeson County. He and his counsel of record signed
the consent judgment which, by its express terms, retained the cause
on the docket. Thereafter service on the attorney of record was suffi-
cient. "The relation of the attorney of record to the action, nothing else
appearing, continues so long as the opposing party has the right by
statute or otherwise to enter a motion therein or to apply to the court
for further relief." . . . The defendant's objection that service was
made upon his attorney of record, is not sustained.
In the plaintiff's action for limited divorce, for alimony, custody
and support for the children, the court acquired jurisdiction of the
parties and the children. That jurisdiction continues and the action is
still pending. "Jurisdiction rests in this court (superior) . . . until the
death of one of the parties, or the youngest child of the marriage
reaches the age of maturity, whichever event shall first occur."...
. . . [T]he Superior Court of Robeson County has the continuing
authority to require compliance with the. . . judgment. The defendant
has threatened to defeat the continuing terms of that judgment by
removing from the State specifically described property now in its
jurisdiction. The equitable power inherent in the superior court is
amply sufficient to warrant the restraint imposed ....
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The following discussion assumes that personal jurisdiction of the
parties existed and focuses on the question of whether the court rendering
judgment had jurisdiction of the subject matter. In rem and quasi in rem
proceedings will be examined separately.
In nations in which legislative power is not constitutionally re-
stricted, the legislature may confer unlimited subject matter jurisdiction
upon its courts, and their judgments will be valid, at least internally.
However, in the United States judicial jurisdiction is limited by legisla-
tion and by requirements of both federal and state constitutions. As to
subject matter jurisdiction, due process limitations are infrequent. How-
u258 N.C. 509, 512-13, 128 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1963); accord, Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-
Wright, 248 N.C. I, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958). However, custody proceedings are in rem in nature,
and the child must be before the court for it to enter a valid order affecting the person of the child
(other than in exercise of its coercive jurisdiction over a parent). Weddington v. Weddington, 243
N.C. 702,705,92 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1956); Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81,47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).
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ever, most state legislatures have created complex court systems that
usually establish some courts whose jurisdiction is limited as to amount
in controversy or subject matter or both.
Judgments of magistrates' courts, recorders' courts, municipal
courts, district courts, separate probate courts, and other "courts of
limited jurisdiction" are frequently collaterally attacked in the original
state or sister states. In either case the local law of the judgment-
rendering state determines whether the judgment is valid, voidable, or
voidA5 If the attack is made in a sister state (where it is necessarily
collateral), the requisite full faith and credit is extended by according to
the judgment precisely the same effect given to it in the state where it
was rendered. Thus, if the judgment may be collaterally attacked at
home for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it may be so attacked
elsewhere.
Normally, if the subject matter jurisdiction is valid where the judg-
ment is rendered, that jurisdiction must be upheld by sister states. This
rule is subject to the exception that if the law of the judgment state that
shields the judgment from collateral attack conflicts with an important
federal policy, then the judgment state's rules of res judicata must yield
to the federal policy.3 Another narrow exception is that exparle divorce
decrees may be collaterally attacked in another state on the ground that
the plaintiff was not domiciled in the decree-granting state, even though
by the law of the latter a finding of domicile would not be subject to
collateral attack.3 8
A state may exercise wide discretion in determining its local law
regarding the permissibility of collateral attack on its own judgments for
want of subject matter jurisdiction. With the exceptions above stated, the
35RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97 (1971). The local law is, of course,
subject to constitutional limitations. Id.
3Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Davis v. Davis,
305 U.S. 32 (1938).
"Kalb v. Feurstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). Kalb held that a federal statute that prevented state
courts from exercising jurisdiction to foreclose mortgages on farmers' lands during federal bank-
ruptcy proceedings overrode such a foreclosure decree erroneously entered and rendered it void and
subject to collateral attack. The policy of the federal statute was strong enough to overcome state
rules of res judicata.
"sWilliams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 266 (1945). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 103 (1971) reads:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the
national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference
with important interests of the sister State.
[Vol. 50
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local law of the judgment state must be followed by sister states in
according full faith and credit. These options are open only in shaping
the local law of a state and not its conflicts rule regarding sister-state
judgments. Under the full faith and credit clause, the conflicts rule of
the forum for this purpose must be to apply the local law of the judg-
ment-granting state to such judgments.
If the jurisdictional question raised by collateral attack has not been
determined by judgment-state law, the forum state might well adopt a
parallel to the solution used by federal courts in diversity cases, that is,
to apply the rule which it believes the state court will adopt when it has
occasion to decide the issue." In these circumstances a state court is
likely to look to its ovn domestic law or to the weight of authority as a
model for resolving the question. As long as such law is not violative of
federal due process standards, this solution would probably be upheld.
One formulation of permissible local law guidelines provides:
Important factors to be considered in determining whether there
are sufficient grounds of public policy for denying the judgment the
effect of res judicata are (I) whether the lack of jurisdiction or compe-
tence over the subject matter of the controversy is clear or doubtful,
(2) whether the determination as to jurisdiction or competence depends
upon questions of fact or of law, (3) whether the court is one of general
or of limited jurisdiction, (4) whether the question of jurisdiction or of
competence was actually litigated and (5) the strength of the policy
underlying the denial of competence to a court.40
Since the domestic North Carolina rules regarding the extent to
which its judgments are subject to collateral attack for asserted lack of
subject matter jurisdiction are the ones to be applied by sister states in
according full faith and credit to North Carolina judgments, an exami-
nation of these North Carolina rules in their conflicts context is appro-
priate. In a number of circumstances, purported North Carolina judg-
31n Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941), the Court observed,
"[T]he proper function of the . . . federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it
ought to be." In Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 901 (1961), Judge Friendly put it this way: "Our principal task, in this diversity of
citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would think the California courts would
think on an issue about which neither has thought. They have had no occasion to do so." Cf.
Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969); Cudahy Co. v. American Lab., Inc., 313
F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D. Neb. 1970).
40
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97, Comment d at 296 (1971). See also
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ments have been held void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
hence subject to collateral attack. The reasoning was well stated in High
v. Pearce:4
The real question upon which decision must rest is that of jurisdic-
tion: Were acts of the clerk of the Superior Court of Johnston County,
in alloting dower to the widow in lands situate in Wilson County, void
for want of jurisdiction?
* . . [A] dower proceeding must be brought in the county of the
residence of the decedent, which in this instance is Wilson County
. . . [T]he proceeding before the clerk of the Superior Court of
Johnston County was coramn non judice and was void for want of
jurisdiction ...
. . . Where there is no jurisdiction of the subject matter the whole
proceeding is void ab initio and may be treated as a nullity anywhere,
at any time, and for any purpose. .. . Obviously, summons is ineffec-
tual to bring a person into such a court; and if he comes voluntarily,
it has no more effect than if he had walked into an empty hall.
Thus, not only purported judgments of clerks of court" but also
those of a justice of the peace,43 the Industrial Commission, 4 county
41220 N.C. 266, 270-71, 17 S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (1941). For an interesting assault upon the
doctrine that consent cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction, see Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdic-
tion By Consent, 40 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1961). The author notes:
The parties cannot give a court jurisdiction of the subject matter by their consent
or acquiescence. So sanctified is this formula that a halo of constitutionality surrounds
it. In the name of this saintly precept a plaintiff may choose his forum, lose his suit and
try again in another forum on the ground that the first court had no jurisdiction.
Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted). Dobbs' conclusion, in part, is that "almost every reason that history
suggests to support the rule against [subject matter] jurisdiction by consent has disappeared ...
When the no consent rule was developed, res judicata was not the significant legal tool that it is
today, and the policies of resjudicata were not weighed in the balance." Id. at 78-79.
41Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. 33, 23 S.E. 976 (1896).
J.R. Cary Co. v. Allegood, 121 N.C. 54, 28 S.E. 61 (1897).
4 Reaves v. Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co., 216 N.C. 462, 5 S.E.2d 305 (1939). The employer and
the employee made an agreement for disability compensation, and this agreement was approved
by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. After some payments had been made under the
agreement, the employer refused further compliance. An award directing compliance was entered
and was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court. In reversing, the Supreme Court said:
IT]he jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission attaches only. . . if the residence of the
employee is in this State. . ..
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courts,45 a special judge,46 and a resident judge of the district court47 were
held void and subject to collateral attack when subject matter jurisdic-
tion was absent. These judgements would not be entitled to full faith and
credit in the courts of sister states. There were also cases holding "void"
purported judgments of superior courts because subject matter jurisdic-
tion was absent.18 Although these decisions were on direct appeal, the
language used is broad enough to encourage courts of sister states, on
collateral attack, to reject other North Carolina superior court judg-
ments having the same or similar infirmities.
The uniform court system prescribed by Article IV of the North
Carolina Constitution became operational throughout the state on Janu-
ary 1, 1971. Since this time, the possibility of a North Carolina judg-
ment being held void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has been
substantially reduced but not entirely eliminated. In pertinent part sec-
tion twelve of Article IV of the Constitution (effective July 1, 1971)
provides:
(3) Except as otherwise provided by the General Assembly, the Supe-
rior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the State.
The Clerks of the Superior Court shall have such jurisdiction and
powers as the General Assembly shall prescribe by general law uni-
formly applicable in every county of the State.
(4). . .The General Assembly shall, by general law uniformly applica-
ble in every local court district of the State, prescribe the jurisdiction
and powers of the District Courts and Magistrates.
(5) . . . The General Assembly may by general law provide that the
jurisdictional limits may be waived in civil cases.
Chapter 7A of the North Carolina General Statutes implements
[ . . N]either the agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant nor the
subsequent payments of the defendant thereupon amounted to a waiver of jurisdic-
tion. . . . It is an administrative board, with quasi-judicial functions . . . and has a
special or limited jurisdiction created by statute and confined to its terms.
Id. at 465, 5 S.E.2d at 306. This voiding of award occurred on direct attack on appeal. By a 1963
amendment to the North Carolina General Statutes, residence of the employee in the state is no
longer a jurisdictional requisite. Ch. 450, § 2 [1963] N.C. Sess. L. 528. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
36 (Supp. 1969).
"Perry v. Owens, 257 N.C. 98, 125 S.E.2d 287 (1962) (counterclaim).
6Reid v. Reid, 199 N.C. 740, 155 S.E. 719 (1930).
4 Hill v. Stansbury, 224 N.C. 356, 30 S.E.2d 150 (1944).
"in Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 137 S.E.2d 806 (1964), an employee sued a co-employee
in the superior court for injuries negligently inflicted in a scope-of-employment situation. The trial
court sustained a plea in bar that under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act a co-
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Article IV of the Constitution. It provides that except for original juris-
diction of claims against the State vested in the Supreme Court and for
the exclusive original jurisdiction for the probate of wills and the admin-
istration of decedents' estates vested in the Superior Court, all original
civil jurisdiction is vested concurrently in both the superior-court divi-
sion and the district-court division of the General Court of Justice4" and
that no civil judgment in a matter of concurrent jurisdiction "is void or
voidable for the sole reason that it was rendered by" one of these two
courts when the "allocation" of the statute provides that the cause
should be tried in the other court50 By limiting trial courts to two and
giving them both general, concurrent jurisdiction except in probate mat-
ters, it appears that the subject matter jurisdiction of a North Carolina
trial court is now not normally subject to domestic collateral attack
except in probate matters. If so construed by the North Carolina courts,
sister states under the full faith and credit clause must accord such
treatment to North Carolina judgments.
These statutory changes do not purport to give subject matter com-
petence to the Industrial Commission beyond its stated statutory pow-
ers 5 nor to confer upon either the superior or district court a jurisdic-
tion which neither possesses. 2 Consequently, there remains the possibil-
employee was immune from such suit. Affirming, the Supreme Court observed that "the proceed-
ings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity." Id. at 465, 137 S.E.2d at
808.
In Corey v. Hardison, 236 N.C. 147, 72 S.E.2d 416 (1952), a municipal election required by
law to be held in 1951 was not held, and thereafter the superior court issued a mandamus to compel
a primary election in January 1952 and a general election in February 1952. This was recited to be
a consent proceeding. The elections were held, and the hold-over municipal officers refused to turn
over their offices to the 1952 electees. In a contempt proceeding brought before another judge or
the superior court, the order to show cause was dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The validity of this conclusion is not diminished . . . by the cifcumstance that the
primary and election were held in obedience to the consent judgment. In the very nature
of things, a court lacks jurisdiction to authorize or compel the holding of an invalid
primary, or a void election. The parties to a cause cannot by consent invest a court with
a power not conferred upon it by law. . . . When a court has no authority to act, its
acts are void, and may be treated as nullities anywhere, at any time, and for any purpose.
Id. at 153,72 S.E.2d at 420.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 117 (1942) provides: "Subject to general equitable considerations
• . . equitable relief will be given from a void judgment."
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-240, -241 (1969).
0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-242 (1969).
5tSee Reaves v. Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co., 216 N.C. 462, 5 S.E.2d 305 (1939).
52See Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 137 S.E.2d 806 (1964); Corey v. Hardison, 236 N.C.
147, 72 S.E.2d 416 (1952); High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. 266, 17 S.E.2d 108 (1941). Cf. Dale v.
Lattimore, 12 N.C. App. 348, 183 S.E.2d 417 (1971).
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ity of collateral attack when a trial tribunal enters a judgment in a
matter over which it possesses neither exclusive nor concurrent subject
matter jurisdiction.
53
When North Carolina courts have been confronted with assertions
that judgments of sister states were not entitled to full faith and credit
because subject matter jurisdiction was absent, the matter has been
resolved by applying the local law of the judgment-granting state. Until
1931 North Carolina followed the common law rule that proof of the
law of another jurisdiction is a question of fact that must be submitted
under proper instructions to the jury for decision by it. 54 Since then, a
statute has provided that the court must take notice not only of sister
state laws but of the laws of foreign countries as well.1 5 Consequently,
the determination today would be made by the court as a question of
law.
Collateral attacks against a West Virginia probate court decree
5
1
and a New York divorce court decree recognizing a property settlement
agreement 57 were denied upon determinations that these courts had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Each judgment was given the legal effect it had
where rendered. However, without reference to the law of Ohio, it was
held that an Ohio court had no subject matter jurisdiction in a divorce
decree to convey title to a parcel of North Carolina land, and such decree
was denied recognition in a title proceeding in North Carolina.5 8 This
situation is almost unique in that adjudication of land title is not nor-
5rThe present writing touches upon only a few aspects of practice and procedure pertinent to
the resolution of foreign-judgment problems. The definitive work on current North Carolina law
in the entire area of practice and procedure is T. WILSON & J. WILSON, MCINTOSH NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Supp. 1970). The author of the 1970 Supplement is Dean
James Dickson Phillips of the University of North Carolina School of Law.
5 4Mottu v. Davis, 153 N.C. 160, 166, 69 S.E. 63,65 (1910).
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1969).
5 Groome v. Leatherwood, 240 N.C. 573, 83 S.E.2d 536 (1954).
5 Howland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 58 S.E.2d 104 (1950). See Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415,
117 S.E.2d 7 (1960).
5'McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948). The court held:
The full faith and credit clause has never been applied without limitation. ...
No principle is more fundamental or firmly settled than that the local sovereignty
by itself, or its judicial agencies, can alone adjudicate upon and determine the status of
land within its borders, including its title and incidents and the mode in which it may be
charged or conveyed. Neither the laws of another sovereignty nor the judicial proceed-
ings, decrees, and judgments of its courts can in the least degree affect such lands.
Id. at 716-17, 47 S.E.2d at 29-30.
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mally a transitory cause of action, and this jurisdiction may be exclu-
sively exercised by the loci court with in rem jurisdiction."
5. Fraud
The law regarding the availability of fraud as a ground for collat-
eral attack of sister-state judgments was originally obscure. One nine-
teenth century Supreme Court decision rejected on procedural grounds
the equitable defense of fraud to an action at law on a Kentucky judg-
ment brought in Mississippi.6" Another contained dicta to the effect that
fraudulent testimony might vitiate a French judgment sought to be en-
forced in the United States."' Yet another clearly distinguished intrinsic
from extrinsic fraud.
62
The North Carolina case of Levin v. Gladstein6 3 cast considerable
light on this problem. In Levin the defendant buyer felt that goods were
not up to sample and returned them from Durham, North Carolina to
the seller in Baltimore, Maryland. When the defendant went to Balti-
more to discuss the matter, he was served with summons in a suit to
5 The enforceability of equity decrees of sister states is discussed following note 143 infra, The
effect to be given to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction by a sister state is considered following note
198 infra.
'Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866). Other inconclusive decisions include
Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); Hanley v.
Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885); and Maxwell v. Stewart, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 77 (1874).
"Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The Court concluded:
The very judgment [French] now sued on would be held inconclusive in almost any other
country than France. In England, and in the Colonies subject to the law of England, the
fraud alleged in its procurement would be a sufficient ground for disregarding it. In the
courts of nearly every other nation, it would be subject to reexamination, either merely
because it was a foreign judgment, or because judgments of that nation would be reexam-
inable in the courts of France.
Id. at 228.
The Court had previously distinguished a judgment of "our own tribunals" from a judgment
of a foreign country in these words:
It has . . . been declared by this court that the fraud which entitles a party to
impeach the judgment of one of our own tribunals must be fraud extrinsic to the matter
tried in the cause, and not merely consist in false and fraudulent documents or testimony
submitted to that tribunal, and the truth of which was contested before it and passed
upon by it. ...
But it is now established in England. . . that foreign judgments may be impeached,
if procured by false and fraudulent representations and testimony of the plaintiff, even
if the same question of fraud was presented to and decided by the foreign court.
Id. at 207.
"2United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (1906).
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recover the purchase price. He then agreed with the plaintiff that the
plaintiff would withdraw the suit and he would accept the goods at a
stated price. Thereafter the plaintiff entered a default judgment in the
Maryland suit against the defendant. In an action on the Maryland
judgment, the North Carolina court refused to accord it full faith and
credit:
[T]he judgment obtained by the fraud of plaintiffs. . . would be open
to attack in the Courts of Maryland . . . and in giving the defendant
relief we are giving the judgment the same "faith and credit" which it
has in that State ...
• . . "If, in the State in which the action is pending, fraud can be
pleaded to an action on a domestic judgment, it is equally available and
equally efficient in actions on judgments of other States ...
[E]quitable as well as legal defenses are . . . admissible in actions at
law.""
Even here, this clear-cut example of extrinsic fraud was not expressly so
labeled but was characterized as "fraud in its procurement.
'65
It should be noted that Levin invokes the local law of the state
rendering judgment to determine whether equitable relief against it is
available but holds that the local law of the forum in which enforcement
is sought determines the procedure to be used in affording such relief.
This rule has been adopted by Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.6" When extrinsic fraud is established, a North Carolina judgment
so tainted is open to collateral attack not only in North Carolina but in
the courts of sister states as well.
67
64d. at 491-92, 55 S.E. at 375. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 118 (1942), comment e
at 575.
65d. at 493, 55 S.E. at 375; accord, Stocks v. Stocks, 179 N.C. 285, 102 S.E. 306 (1920).
16RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 (1971) states: "A judgment will not
be recognized or enforced in other states if upon the facts shown to the court equitable relief could
be obtained against the judgment in the state of rendition." Comment a to the proposed official
draft stated that § 115 "does not apply to relief against a judgment which could be obtained in
the state of rendition only in the proceeding itself, either in the trial court, as by a motion to have
the judgment set aside on the ground of newly discovered evidence, or an appeal." Id. at 411
(Proposed Official Draft 1967). (This comment was omitted from the Restatement as finally
adopted.)
Comment d at 334, in pertinent part, reads: "If the state of rendition follows the usual rule,
only fraud . . . which deprives the complainant of an opportunity to present adequately his claim
or defense, will provide a basis for equitable relief against the judgment." Comment b at 333 adds:
"[T]he local law of the state of rendition will be applied to determine whether equitable relief can
be obtained against the judgment. On the other hand, the local law of the state where recognition
or enforcement of the judgment is sought determines the procedure for obtaining such relief.'
" See note 66 supra.
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The assertion that the judgment collaterally attacked was obtained
by perjured testimony or false evidence is the one most frequently
brought to court. The courts consistently classify this allegation as a
reliance on intrinsic fraud and deny relief. McCoy v. Justice"8 is typical.
In that case the defendants, the administrator and widow of a decedent,
had previously obtained a final judgment against the plaintiff for crimi-
nal conversation with and alienation of the affections of decedent's wife.
In affirming the granting of the defendants' motion for nonsuit, the
court said:
The essence of the plaintiffs case . . . is crystallized in an effort to set
aside the judgment upon the ground of false testimony. If the judgment
were vacated for this cause and the plaintiff were again the unsuccessful
party why could he not assail the second judgment upon similar allega-
tions? It is for the public good that there be an end to litigation."
A 1969 case reaffirmed the basic rule of McCoy in refusing to set aside
a Massachusetts judgment which the plaintiff testified was procured by
-199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452 (1930).
"Id. at 613, 155 S.E. at 459. The McCoy opinion further states:
The objection to relitigation rests upon solid ground.
[n] United States v. Throckmorton, [98 U.S. 61 (1878)] .. .the Supreme
Court stated the principle that relief may be given to a party against whom a judgment
has been rendered if the fraud practiced upon him prevented him from presenting all his
case to the court, but that a judgment will not be set aside on perjured testimony or for
any matter that was presented and considered in the judgment assailed ...
• . .Pico v. Cohn, [91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 970 (189 I)]. . .held that perjured testimony
procured by bribery on the part of the successful party is not ground for setting aside a
final decree, although it is reasonably certain that the result of a new trial would be
different. . . . [T]he Court said: ". . . Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever
finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice ..
Our own decisions have from the beginning been in accord with these principles. In
Gatlin v. Kilpatrick, 4 N.C., 147 [1814], it was held that if a party's claims have been
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and he has had an opportunity of presenting
them he shall no longer be at liberty, if unsuccessful, to harass his adversary ....
Equity will not set aside even an "unconscientious verdict at law unless it were not
competent to the complaining party to make his defense in a court of law." Peace v.
Nailing, 16 N.C., 289 [1829].
• ..[I1n Dyche v. Patton, 43 N.C. 295 [1852] . . .the Court held that a verdict
obtained in a court of law by perjured testimony would not be set aside unless the witness
on whose testimony the verdict was given had been convicted of perjury or a sufficient
reason was given for failure to prosecute him. . . .The principle was stressed in Mott
v. Davis, 153 N.C. 160, [69 S.E. 63 (1910)] in these words: "... [P]erjury, being
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her own perjured testimony.70 Whether the intervening conviction of a
material witness for perjury committed in the trial leading to the ques-
tioned judgment would change the rule and permit collateral attack is
an issue that appears to be open for determination in North Carolina.
There are dicta to the effect that such facts would alter the result.71 The
crime of perjury is difficult to prove, and convictions thereof are rare;
hence, it is not surprising that this precise problem has not come to the
court for decision. The Restatement of Judgments72 would deny collat-
eral relief from the judgment, even after the conviction of a party or
material witness for perjury or forgery material to the rendition of the
judgment. A fortiori, the Restatement would deny collateral relief for
the mere admission of perjury made by the witness.
Other examples of intrinsic fraud are collected in Johnson v.
Stephenson.73 In Johnson the court refused to impose a constructive trust
on certain real estate devised under a will that allegedly had been pro-
cured by undue influence and fraud. The court held that since the' right
of direct attack by caveat gave the daughter a full and adequate remedy,
equitable relief by way of constructive trust was not available.
In Johnson the court also discussed the difference between extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud, noting decisions by other courts that allow an heir
to establish a constructive trust collaterally, despite the probate of a
will, where it is proved that the decree of probate was obtained by
extrinsic fraud that deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to caveat. 74
Several examples of extrinsic fraud, which can be attacked collaterally,
were set out by the court. These included false representations made to
an heir out of court that caused him to defer filing a caveat until the
time limit elapsed; 75 false statements made in procuring probate that the
intrinsic fraud, is not ground for equitable relief against a judgment resulting from it,
but the fraud which warrants equity in interfering with such a solemn thing as a judgment
must be such as is practiced in obtaining the judgment and which prevents the losing
party from having an adversary trial of the issue."
Id. at 606-08, 155 S.E. at 455-56. Accord, Crescent Hat Co. v. Chizik, 223 N.C. 371, 26 S.E.2d
871 (1943) (upholding a New York judgment); Cody v. Hovey, 216 N.C. 391,396, 5 S.E.2d 165,
168 (1939) (upholding a New York judgment); Horne v. Edwards, 215 N.C. 622, 3 S.E.2d 1 (1939)
(upholding a North Carolina judgment).
7 Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 167 S.E.2d 549, cert. denied, 275 N.C. 501 (1969).
"See Dyche v. Patton, 56 N.C. 332 (1857); Moore v. Gulley, 144 N.C. 81, 56 S.E. 681 (1907).
"2RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 126, Comment c at 614 (1942).
73269 N.C. 200, 152 S.E.2d 214 (1967).
"Id. at 204-05, 152 S.E.2d at 218.
7"Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758 (1933).
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deceased left no heirs, as a result of which the heir did not receive notice
of the proceedings in time to file a caveat;76 false statements purporting
to show service of notice on next of kin;77 and intentional failure to
disclose to the probate court the existence of a pretermitted heir.7" Other
instances held not to constitute extrinsic fraud are the intentional failure
of an administrator to plead the statute of limitations in defense to an
otherwise valid claim against the estate;79 conduct and representations
of an insurer's local agent that deprived the insurer of an opportunity
to defend against a claim reduced to judgment, in the absence of collu-
sion between the agent and the claimant; 0 the inducement of a North
Carolina resident to appear personally in a New York suit by commenc-
ing that suit by attachment proceedings; 8' and the failure of a defen-
dant's attorney to file an answer when there was no collusion with the
plaintiff.,2
Six inequitable circumstances attendant to a judgment and yet not
constituting grounds for collateral attack are given in Restatement oJ'
Judgments. These are ignorance of pendency of an in rem proceeding;
false testimony or documents; nonfraudulent, factual misrepresentation
by the original plaintiff causing the original defendant not to defend;
newly discovered evidence; error of law or fact by the court, the present
complainant, or his attorney; and negligence of the attorney or other
agent of the present complainant."
The forum state must apply the local law of the judgment state in
determining what constitutes extrinsic fraud. The North Carolina con-
7 Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal. App. 2d 309, 61 P.2d 976 (1936).
7Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927).
7'Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal. 2d 322, 65 P.2d 777 (1937).
'Best v. Best, 161 N.C. 513,77 S.E. 762 (1913).
"North Carolina Mut. & Provident Ass'n v. Edwards, 168 N.C. 378, 84 S.E. 359 (1915).
"'Williamson v. Jerome, 169 N.C. 215, 85 S.E. 300 (1915). RESTATEMENT OF JuDMLNTS § 38
(1942) provides: "If, in a proceeding begun by attachment or garnishment or by a creditor's bill in
a court which has no jurisdiction over the defendant, he enters a general appearance, the court may
render a judgment against him personally." However, § 39 reads, "If. . .he enters an appearance
solely for the purpose of contesting the validity of the proceedings, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over him and cannot render a judgment against him personally." Finally, § 40 states,
"If. . .he enters an appearance for the purpose of contesting the validity of the plaintiff's claim,
he does not thereby subject himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court, if in appearing he
states that he does not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court."
82Ring v. Whitman, 194 N.C. 544, 140 S.E. 159 (1927).
'mRESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 126(2)(a)-(f) (Supp. 1948).
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flict of laws rule, as stated in Levin v. Gladstein,84 so holds. The
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws provides:
Recognition and enforcement will be denied the judgment if equitable
relief on the ground of fraud could be obtained against it in the state
of rendition. If the state of rendition follows the usual rule, only fraud
• . . which deprives the complainant of an opportunity to present ade-
quately his claim or defense, will provide a basis for equitable relief
against the judgment.1
It further states that
the local law of the state of rendition will be applied to determine
whether equitable relief can be obtained against the judgment. On the
other hand, the local law of the state where recognition or enforcement
of a judgment is sought determines the procedure for obtaining such
relief. 6
The remedy of obtaining a new trial in the original proceeding,
based upon newly discovered evidence previously unavailable (but not so
because of negligence of the movant) or upon other grounds, is wholly
separate from seeking collateral relief predicated on fraud.8 7 The relief
from judgment now provided for by Rule Sixty of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure gives a remedy which is at least in part cumula-
tive to collateral attack by a separate action. s However, procedures
"'142 NC. 482, 491, 55 S.E. 371, 375 (1906).
YzRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115, Comment dat 334 (1971).
mid. Comment b at 333.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 59 (1969) details motion for new trial grounds and proce-
dures.
-See Robinson v. McAdams, I I N.C. App. 105, 109, 180 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1971). N.C. GEN.
STAT. § IA-I, Rule 60(b) (1969) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (3) Fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party . . . . The motion shall be made . . . not more than one
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
section does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 120-121 (1942) are directed to the circumstances under
which the judgment-rendering jurisdiction should grant equitable relief against its own judgments.
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
under either Rule Fifty-Nine or Sixty, where pursued to conclusion, may
result in res judicata consequences.
Strangers to a judgment may collaterally impeach it not only for
extrinsic fraud but also where it has been procured through the fraud of
either party or the collusion of both for the purpose of defrauding a third
person."9
6. Public Policy Considerations
There is a very narrow range within which the public policy of the
forum jurisdiction will permit exceptions to the mandate of the full faith
and credit clause. Thus, under the supremacy clause a federal bank-
ruptcy court need not recognize a state mortgage-foreclosure decree
entered in violation of the bankruptcy act.9 Perhaps more clearly a
matter of public policy, one state will not enforce a fine or other criminal
judgment of a sister state."' On the other hand, if the judgment grants
monetary relief to an individual, as distinguished from a state or state
agency, it is held not to be penal in nature and is entitled to full faith
and credit.92
A regular judgment of a sister state based upon a tax claim must
be accorded full faith and credit.93 However, mere tax claims or adminis-
trative tax assessments of one state need not be entertained in the courts
of another state. In spite of this fact, voluntary statutes permitting such
suits on a reciprocal basis are now common, and North Carolina has
such legislation.94 Antedating this statute, there is a maverick North
8Strickland v. Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 160 S.E.2d 313 (1968). Here, an insurer filed a motion
to intervene in a suit pending against its insured in which it asserted that there was collusion between
the plaintiff and the insured. The court denied intervention but said that in a subsequent action
against the insurer, it could "plead the defense of fraud and collusion incident to the manner in
which judgment is obtained." Id. at 490, 160 S.E.2d at 320. Regarding the rights of a "stranger,"
interested in but not a party to a judgment, the court stated: "Judgments of any court may be
impeached for fraud or collusion by strangers to them who, if the judgment were given full faith
and credit, would be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing right." Id. at 488, 160 S.E.2d at
318; accord, Manning v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.C. 1964),
citing Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1965).
9OKalb v. Fuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
91The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); cf. Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal
Judgments in the United States, 32 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 114 (1964). The question of the enforcement
of criminal judgments by sister states is wholly apart from questions of extradition.
"2Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (civil suit
for treble damages for an overcharge made in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act).
"Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).




Carolina case in which New Jersey was permitted to recover on a claim
for delinquent corporate franchise taxes assessed and asserted against an
insolvent corporation in a state proceeding in North Carolina.9 5 This
case typifies the adage that a strong offense is the best defense. New
Jersey insisted it was entitled to preferred creditor status since it held a
tax claim; the court contented itself with denying preferred status and
allowing the claim only general creditor status; the court and all con-
cerned never considered the possibility that as a foreign tax claim-as
distinguished from a judgment-it was entitled to no recognition at all.
When a collateral attack is based on forum public policy, the con-
tention is often made that the foreign judgment enforced a gambling
transaction. This issue was raised in Fauntleroy v. Lum.96 A claim based
on a Mississippi cotton futures contract, illegal in Mississippi, became
the subject of an arbitration award in Mississippi, and this award was
reduced to judgment in Missouri. Mississippi refused to accord full faith
and credit to the Missouri judgment. The United States Supreme Court
held that full faith and credit must be given to the Missouri judgment,
even though it violated Mississippi public policy. 7 This decision narrows
almost to the vanishing point the area of state public policy relief from
the mandate of the full faith and credit clause-at least so far as the
judgments of sister states are concerned.
Although North Carolina has asserted this public policy approach,
it has avoided a direct confrontation with the federal constitutional issue.
In Cody v. Hovey,9" the plaintiff obtained a New York judgment against
the defendants in an amount in excess of one million dollars. In a suit
on this judgment, the defendant conceded the jurisdiction of the New
York court but asserted that the judgment was not entitled to full faith
and credit, since the transaction on which it was based was a void stock
market gambling transaction denounced by a North Carolina statute.
That statute provided, "[N]or shall courts of this State have any juris-
diction to entertain any suit or action brought upon a judgment based
upon any such [gambling] contract." 9 Following two appeals, the
North Carolina Supreme Court, after citing Fauntleroy and purporting
in part to distinguish it, remanded to the trial court to determine whether
95Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905).
06210 U.S. 230 (1908).
1Id. at 234.
9"216 N.C. 391, 5 S.E.2d 165 (1939).
"Ch. 853, § 1, [1909] N.C. Sess. L. 1257.
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the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to assert the same
defense in the earlier New York proceeding.' At this point a settlement
or other disposition possibly occurred. At any rate, the case was neither
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States nor again appealed
in North Carolina. Cody stands as a monument to the ingenuity of
defense counsel rather than as a landmark of federal constitutional law.
Consequently, Fauntleroy remains good law, and it is most doubtful
whether the effort made to distinguish it in Cody would withstand Fed-
eral Supreme Court scrutiny."'
7. Final Money Judgments.
A valid judgment of a state court of last resort is a final judgment
for full faith and credit purposes. The same is true of inferior court
judgments when no direct appeal has been taken within the time pre-
scribed. The weight of authority holds that a pending appeal from a trial
court or intermediate appellate court judgment does not in itself deprive
that judgment of full faith and credit finality but does vest the courts of
other states with the discretionary power to stay proceedings in a suit
on that judgment until the appeal has been determined in the original
jurisdiction.
02
For purposes of res judicata and enforcement of the judgment in
other states, the effect of an appeal is determined by the local law of the
judgment-rendering state. 113 Thus, a California judgment pending appeal
1001The full faith and credit clause] would not prevent a state from withdrawing the
jurisdiction of its courts from an action to enforce a judgment rendered in another state
when it is made to appear clearly that the judgment was awarded on transactions forbid-
den by the public policy or statute law of the state, and that the question of the illegality
of such transactions had not been raised, considered or determined in the court of the
original forum.
Cody v. Hovey, 219 N.C. 369, 374-75, 14 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1941).
"'See Note, Conflict of Laws-Power of State to Deprive Courts of Jurisdiction to Hear Out-
of-State Judgments, 18 N.C.L. REV. 224 (1940). Remarking upon Cody's evasions of the full faith
and credit issue, the writer concludes:
[I]f a state cannot refuse to give full faith and credit to an out-of-state judgment based
on a cause of action contrary to the public policy of the forum, the method of depriving
their [sic] courts of jurisdiction to entertain any suit on such a judgment is an attempt
to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.
Id. at 229.
'1Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., I I R.I. 411 (1877); Note, The Finality of Judgments In the
Conflict of Laws, 41 COL. L. REV. 878 (1941).
1ORESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment d at 164 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (1971).
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is not a final judgment." 4 However, a North Carolina judgment on
appeal, at least until 1970, was by statute final until reversed.0 5 Concur-
rently with the repeal of that statute, North Carolina adopted a parallel
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a judgment on
appeal continues to be final until actually reversed.0 6 Presumably the
established North Carolina rule remains unchanged.
The full faith and credit clause does not, however, compel the sec-
ond jurisdiction to take judicial notice of.the law of the judgment state.
Accordingly, if forum law requires proof of the law of a sister state and
this is not made, the forum may apply its own local law to determine
the effect of an appeal upon the finality of a judgment.0 7 This problem
would not arise in a suit on a sister-state judgment brought in North
Carolina, since North Carolina requires its courts to take notice not only
of the laws of sister states but also of the laws of foreign countries.'
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the trial judge equally wide
power in this respect.'
A judgment on the pleadings, without trial, is a final judgment. 110
" "An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final
determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner
satisfied." CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1049 (West 1955). See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 709, 719 (E.D. Wash. 1962).
11"The statute, most recently codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-221 (1953), was enacted from
early English law, 4 Hen. 4, c. 23 (1402). It was repealed in 1967, ch. 954, § 4. [1967] N.C. Sess.
L. 1353, to be effective July 1, 1969. The effective date was changed to January 1, 1970 by ch. 895,
§ 21, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1033.
'OSee United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 720-25 (E.D. Wash. 1962).
"'See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).




1FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. The federal district court for Nebraska, sitting in diversity, has held
that proof of foreign law is a matter of procedure and not substance. Accordingly, although
Nebraska law requires the party relying thereon to plead and prove foreign law, the federal district
court under its own procedural rules took notice of and applied as controlling the substantive law
of another state, in spite of the fact that it had not been pleaded or proved. Epperson v. Christensen,
324 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Neb. 1971); Fullington v. Iowa Sheet Metal Contractors, 319 F. Supp. 243
(D. Neb. 1970).
"*Marsh v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 151 N.C. 160, 65 S.E. 911 (1909). InMarsh the court
gave full faith and credit to a Florida judgment on the same cause which had been rendered on a
demurrer to the complaint. See Johnson v. Pate, 90 N.C. 334 (1884).
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 50 (1942) provides: "Where a valid and final personal judg-
ment in favor of the defendant is rendered on the ground that the complaint is insufficient in law,
the judgment is conclusive as to the matters determined, and if the judgment is on the merits the
plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original cause of action."
Accord, Cobb v. Clark, 257 F. Supp. 175, 176 (M.D.N.C. 1966). "[T]he State court judgment,
though rendered on the pleadings and not after trial, was on the, merits, and. . . such judgment is
as binding as if the judgment had been entered for the defendants after trial and verdict."
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A judgment based on a successful plea of the statute of limitations is
final in the granting jurisdiction but has no binding effect in other states
in which the period of limitation has not yet run on the cause of action.",
A judgment of nonsuit, either voluntary or involuntary, or a dismissal
without prejudice is not a final judgment.112 Similarly, a judgment based
upon the ground that a fact essential to the plaintiff's claim has not yet
occurred, thus making the action premature, is not final."' Judgments
upon the merits of counterclaims"' or recoupment or set-off defenses",
are final except when an affirmative judgment in favor of the claimant
cannot be rendered in the original action." 6
8. Merger and Bar
A cause of action reduced to a money judgment in the court of a
sister state is merged in that judgment. A judgment for the defendant
becomes a bar to suit on the same cause in another state. In either case,
unless the judgment is void suit may not thereafter be brought in another
state on the original cause of action.17 However, when the judgment is
upon another judgment, merger does not take place, and execution or
further suit in other states may be had on either judgment until one full
satisfaction is obtained." 8 A chain of such proceedings in numerous
states is, of course, possible.
"'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49, Comment a (1942). See Vanderbilt v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 188 N.C. 568, 580, 125 S.E. 387, 394 (1924); Patton v. W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 171
N.C. 837, 839, 73 S.E. 167 (1911).
"'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 53 (1942). Accord, Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 158
S.E.2d 845 (1968) (voluntary nonsuit); Vickers v. Russell, 253 N.C. 394, 117 S.E.2d 45 (1960)
(involuntary nonsuit).
North Carolina's new rules of civil procedure restrict nonsuit activities. For a discussion of
the restrictive effects on nonsuit activities of N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rules 41, 52, see Cutts v.
Casey, 278 N.C. 390,419, 180 S.E.2d 297,313 (197 1); T. WILSON & J. WILSON, MCINTOSil NORTIh
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1375, 1485.5 (Supp. 1970).
"'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 54 (1942).
"'Id. § 56.
"5 d. § 60.
"1id. § 57; Saieed v. Abeyounis, 217 N.C. 644, 9 S.E.2d 399 (1940).
"71d. § 47; Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 149, 134 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1964). See Morris v.
Burgess, 116 N.C. 40, 21 S.E. 27 (1895); Carter v. Wilson, 19 N.C. 276 (1837); Carter v. Wilson,
I8 N.C. 362 (1835); Wade v. Wade, I N.C. 601 (1804).
'"RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47, Comment k (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-




Since the weight of authority holds that a pending appeal from a
judgment does not divest that judgment of finality for full faith and
credit purposes, occasionally such a judgment will be reversed by direct
appeal in the original proceedings after it has been reduced to judgment
in a sister state. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court held in
Reed v. Allen' that the judgment of the second state, assuming its court
had jurisdiction, remains res judicata of the issues involved, despite the
reversal of the original judgment. Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone
vigorously disse.nted,120 and for practical purposes their view has
prevailed.
The judgment debtor may seek reversal of the second judgment on
appeal or may attempt to enjoin its enforcement by independent equity
proceedings in the second state. In such a situation the remedy, as distin-
guished from the right, is to be determined by the law of the second
state. 121
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has had occasion to resolve
this question of the consequence of reversal of the original judgment. In
Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Garman, 22 a default deficiency judg-
ment had been entered against the defendants, who were husband and
wife, in a Pennsylvania court upon a warrant of attorney on a mortgage
note. The plaintiff obtained a judgment in North Carolina based upon
this Pennsylvania judgment and the defendants appealed. Meanwhile,
119286 U.S. 191 (1932). See also Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903).
110A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiples
impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity. By the judgment about to
be rendered, the respondent, caught in a mesh of.procedural complexities, is told that
there is only one way out of them, and this is a way he failed to follow. Because of that
omission he is left to be ensnared in the web, the process of the law, so it is said, being
impotent to set him free. I think the paths to justice are not so few and narrow. A little
of the liberality of method that has shaped the law of restitution in the past . . . is still
competent to find a way.
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
"'Ellis v. McGovern, 153 App. Div. 26, 31, 137 N.Y.S. 1029, 1032 (1912). RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 44 (1942) provides: "Where a judgment in an action is based upon a prior judgment,
and the prior judgment is thereafter reversed; the judgment in the second action cannot be collater-
ally attacked, but it can be set aside by appropriate proceedings in that action, or equitable or other
proceedings by way of restitution can be maintained." Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 112 (1971): "A judgment will not be enforced in other states if it has been vacated in
the state of rendition."
122220 N.C. 585, 18 S.E.2d 182 (1942).
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the wife appeared in the original Pennsylvania proceeding, had it re-
opened, proved that she had been only a surety, and-under the Pennsy-
lvania rule that a married woman could not become a surety-obtained
an order "that said judgment . . as respects . . [the wife] be stricken
from the record."' Pending the North Carolina appeal, the defendants
then moved the Supreme Court of North Carolina to grant a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. After determining that both
the original Pennsylvania judgment and the subsequent revision thereof
were valid under Pennsylvania law, the court affirmed judgment against
the husband but granted the wife a new trial, saying:
The original judgment of the [Pennsylvania court] as to Sarah
Edith Garman having been stricken from the record after the rendition
of the judgment thereof in this State, it would be manifestly unjust to
affirm the judgment in this State. Hence, in the discretion of the Court
the motion for a new trial as to her is granted.'
The treatment accorded the Pennsylvania judgment by the North Caro-
lina courts was to give it at all times the same faith and credit then
accorded to it in Pennsylvania. This is an impeccable discharge of the
federal constitutional full faith and credit requirement. The procedure
here was not complicated since the issue was raised on direct appeal.
If the second-state judgment has become final, the Restatement of
Conflicts rule is that the effect of the reversal of the first judgment on
the purported finality of the second is determined by the local law of the
second state, regardless of whether the issue is raised in the second or
any other state.'2 However, section 112 of the Restatement of Conflicts
assumes that the local law of the second state will not permit the enforce-
ment of its judgment under these circumstances.2 6 Consequently, the




Payment in full of a judgment or its discharge by accord and satis-
faction, release, or discharge in bankruptcy prevents the enforcement
'mId. at 595, 18 S.E.2d at 188.
1211d. at 596, 18 S.E.2d at 189.
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1971).
1id. § 112. See note 121 supra.
l'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 (1971).
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thereof in another state. 28 In the chain-judgment situation, in which
multiple judgments have been obtained elsewhere upon the original judg-
ment, the discharge of the original judgment or any of the others based
thereon, either directly or indirectly, discharges all such judgments.'
2'
Similarly, partial payment will be recognized as a defense in enforce-
ment proceedings brought in other jurisdictions. This fundamental rule
was applied by the North Carolina Supreme Court in a suit brought on
a South Dakota judgment in which the defendant prioved payments made
by him to the plaintiff since the rendition of the South Dakota judgment
and proved that other amounts had been collected by the plaintiff in
South Dakota for which the plaintiff was accountable to the defen-
dant."I
Normally a discharged judgment will continue to have the same res
judicata effect in the state of rendition as it did before discharge. The
full faith and credit clause requires sister states to give this judgment the
same res judicata effect as that accorded by the state of rendition.'
3'
I1. Inconsistent Judgments
Occasionally the situation arises in which a second court in a suit on a
judgment rende.red by a first jurisdiction erroneously finds that the first
court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person of
the defendant, and the second judgment either is not appealed or is
erroneously affirmed on appeal. Such a question raises obvious full faith
and credit problems for a third jurisdiction. Must it enforce the first or
the second judgment? The rule is that the second judgment, even though
patently erroneous on its face, may not be collaterally attacked for error
and must be accorded full faith and credit if the second court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.132 Thus, despite the fact
that the first judgment is not merged in the second, the unreversed
finding by the second court that the first was without jurisdiction be-
comes res judicata as to that issue and may be asserted defensively
against a suit on the first judgment in any other jurisdiction. The only
remedy against the second judgment is a direct appeal in the second
121"A judgment will not be enforced in other states if the judgment has been discharged by
payment or otherwise under the local law of the state of rendition." Id. § 116.
121Id. Comment c.
'"Roberts v. Pratt, 158 N.C. 50, 73 S.E. 129 (1911).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 116, Comment b (1971).
1T rreinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
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jurisdiction, carried to the Supreme Court of the United States from that
jurisdiction if need be. If the appeal perpetuates the error, the party is
then in effect without remedy. Moreover, the fact that the second court
through error has failed to accord full faith and credit to the first judg-
ment does not in these circumstances render the second judgment nuga-
tory.' Federal adjudication on this issue is, of course, conclusive.
Where there is a chain of relitigation by the same parties in state
courts, a federal court has indicated that its full faith and credit duty is
to recognize the most recent judgment, thus stopping the litigation at
that point.134 Complicated facts of this nature have produced some litiga-
tion, 3 5 and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides that the latest
judgment shall prevail.136 This question does not appear to have been
submitted to the appellate courts of North Carolina.
12. Statutes of Limitation Applicable to Foreign Judgments
The forum court applies its own local statute of limitations
-including its borrowing provisions, which refer to and adopt in certain
circumstances the statutes of limitation of other jurisdictions-to suits
upon sister-state judgments. This practice does not violate the full faith
and credit clause, even when the statute of limitations of the judgment-
rendering state has not yet barred the judgment. 37 Conversely, in the
absence of a borrowing statute, the forum may enforce a sister-state
judgment even though that judgment is already barred by the statute of
limitations of the judgment-granting state. Moreover, the second judg-
ment thus obtained must be given full faith and credit by the state of
the original judgment as well as by the courts of other states. 3 1
'DId.
rePorter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970). The court
also held that it was the duty of the federal district court for Arizona, in diversity, under Eric R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to accept the decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Id. at
259.
"Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1942), cert,
denied, 319 U.S. 774 (1943); Perkins v. DeWitt, 279 App. Div. 903, III N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952)
(mem.); Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952); cf. Eyber
v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 249 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1966).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 (1971) provides:
A judgment . . . will not be recognized or enforced in sister States if an inconsistent,
but valid, judgment is subsequently rendered in another action between the parties and
if the earlier judgment is superseded by the later judgment under the local law of the State
where the later judgment was rendered.
23McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 118(2) (1971).




These principles have been clearly enunciated in the North Carolina
cases. In Sayer v. Henderson, 13 a North Carolina suit on a New York
judgment, the court reiterated these principles:
"'The power of the Legislature of each State to enact statutes of
limitation and rules of prescription is well recognized and unques-
tioned. It is a fundamental principle of law that remedies are to be
governed by the laws of the jurisdiction where the suit is brought. The
lex Jori determines the time within which a cause of action shall be
enforced.'"
These results are consistent with the conventional classification of
statutes of limitations as procedural for conflict of laws purposes and,
hence, determinable by the local law of the forum. In Wise v.
Hollowell' the court concurred in this principle, stating: "In the trial
of an action whatever relates merely to the remedy and constitutes a part
of the procedure, is determined by the law of the forum; but whatever
goes to the substance of the controversy and affects the rights of the
parties is governed by the lex loci."
In a suit commenced on March 27, 1899 to collect unpaid support
and alimony, payable on a semi-annual basis, awarded by an Illinois
divorce decree entered November 16, 1880, a majority of the North
Carolina court reached the interesting conclusion that payments that
became due less than ten years before March 27, 1899 were not barred
by the pertinent ten year North Carolina statute of limitations but that
as to payments falling due earlier than then the statute precluded re-
covery.'4 ' The majority opinion held:
The plea of the statute, in an action in our State on a judgment ob-
tained in another State is a plea to the remedy, and consequently the
lexfori must prevail in such an action. . . .That, in North Carolina,
is the 10-year [sic] statute. . . .The language is, "From the date of
the rendition of said judgment or decree." That must refer to a judg-
ment which is at once due and collectable. It can not reasonably intend
a judgment which in terms is not due and collectible until a future day,
without presenting the absurdity of a statute barring or running against
a judgment debt before the debt is due or collectible. We are of the
"'225 N.C. 642, 643, 35 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1945), quoting Vanderbilt v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 188 N.C. 568,580, 125 S.E. 387, 394 (1924); accord, Webb v. Webb, 222 N.C. 551,23 S.E.2d
897 (1943). But see Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N.C. 190, 37 S.E. 212 (1900).
140205 N.C. 286, 290, 171 S.E. 82, 84 (1933).
"'Arrington v. Arrington, 127 .N.C. 190, 37 S.E. 212 (1900).
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opinion, therefore, that the annual sums adjudged in favor of the plain-
tiff which became due and collectible more than ten years before the
institution of this action, are barred by The Code . . . and that those
that became due within the ten years are not barred.'
A vigorous dissent decried this exercise of judicial clemency in softening
the impact of the statute of limitations as then worded.
4 3
13. Equity and Probate Decrees
The enforcement of final money judgments of sister states has been
the focus of attention up to this point. The question now becomes
whether the mandate of full faith and credit extends to all other sister-
state judicial acts. The short answer is no. The leading case establishing
that full faith and credit need not be extended to an equity decree of a
sister state is Fall v. Eastin. "I In Fall the United States Supreme Court
held that Nebraska was not obliged to enforce a Washington commis-
sioner's deed purporting to convey title to Nebraska land pursuant to a
Washington divorce decree. The majority opinion held:
[W]e think that the doctrine that the court, not having jurisdiction of
the res, cannot affect it by its decree, nor by a deed made by a master
in accordance with the decree, is firmly established ...
This doctrine is entirely consistent with the provision of the Con-
stitution of the United States, which requires a judgment in any State
to be given full faith and credit in the courts of every other State. This
provision does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one State to
property situated in another, but only makes the judgment rendered
conclusive on the merits of the claim or subject-matter of the suit.'
The Court concluded:
[T]he ruling of the [Nebraska] court, that the decree in Washington
gave no such equities as could be recognized in Nebraska as justifying
an action to quiet title does not offend the Constitution of the United
States .... 146
In a suit by the wife to enforce an Ohio divorce decree directing a
"1id. at 197-98, 37 S.E. at 214.
13d. at 199, 37 S.E. at 215. The statute, unchanged in substance in its application to roreign
judgments, is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(I) (1969).





husband to convey his interest in North Carolina land to her, and
providing that if this were not done the decree itself would be the convey-
ance, the North Carolina court, expressly relying on Fall v. Eastin,
dismissed the action.1 17 This decision continues to be the law in North
Carolina.'4
A majority of the states,'49 including Nebraska,"10 have moved away
from the doctrine of Fall v. Eastin and, though not under full faith and
credit compulsion to do so, voluntarily give res judicata effect to sister-
state decrees based upon in personam jurisdiction that affect title to out-
of-state lands. The trend is for the situs court to give effect to the title
disposition made by the out-of-state decree, at least as between the
original parties and their privies.' The rationale for this practice, so far
as the first state is concerned, was presented in a California divorce case
when the trial court had ordered the division of community real property
in North Dakota. There, Justice Traynor said:
[T]he present case is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit in
North Dakota to the extent that it determines the rights and equities
of the parties with respect to the land in question. An action on that
judgment in North Dakota, however, is necessary to effect any change
in the title to the land there. Thus, the judgment must be affirmed to
" McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948).
The familiar principle that a court having jurisdiction of the parties may, in a proper
case, by a decree in personam, require the execution of a conveyance of real property in
another state ... [and] enforce its order through its coercive jurisdiction or authority
is not here involved. The plaintiff seeks to establish the Ohio judgment as a muniment
of title and to recover the locus on the strength thereof. That raises the question of the
validity and efficacy of the Ohio decree as a judgment affecting the title and right of
possession to land in North Carolina.
... Its judgment cannot have any extraterritorial force in rem. Nor did it create a
personal obligation upon the defendant McRary which the courts of this state are bound
to compel him to perform. At most it imposed a duty, the performance of which may
be enforced by the process of the Ohio court.
Id. at 717-18,47 S.E.2d at 30.
"'Noble v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 601, 86 S.E.2d 89 (1955).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 (1971) states: "A valid judgment
that orders the doing of an act other than the payment of money or that enjoins the doing of an
act may be enforced in other states." Note that the language is permissive, not mandatory. Com-
ment d at 311 observes that the majority and more recent cases permit the maintenance of such
actions. See generally Currie, Full Faith and Credit to -Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
620 (1959).
15'NVeesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959).
"rhis trend has been followed by North Dakota by giving res judicata effect to a California
probate decree determining rights in North Dakota land and by entering a conforming North
Dakota quiet title decree. In re Reynold's Will, 85 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1957).
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the extent that it declares the rights of the parties before the court and
modified to the extent that it purports to affect the title to the land.,"
It is entirely possible that effective advocacy might cause the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina to recede from the citadel of Fall v.
Eastin and to reconsider this whole question as one of res judicata. There
is North Carolina judicial approval supporting this receptive view, al-
though embedded in a dissenting opinion which antedates by one
hundred thirty years the celebrated "modern" view expressed by former
Chief Justice Traynor. In 1827 Chief Justice Taylor of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reasoned:
If the assistance of this Court were sought to effectuate a decree
of a foreign Court of Chancery, the merits of it would be open to
examination, and we should be convinced ot its justice and propriety,
before we proceeded. Like a foreign judgment at law, it would be but
prima facie evidence of the justice of the demand. But when the Consti-
tution of the United States has declared, that "full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings of every other state" . . . I do not see how, in point of
effect, a final decree can be distinguished from a judgment at law, for
the term "judicial proceedings" includes both; and if this decree would
in South-Carolina bb deemed condusive [sic] on the rights of the par-
ties, it must be so here ....
In considering the effect of a judgment or decree, pronounced in
another State, and duly authenticated here, it appears to me that the
only question open for discussion is, whether the Court had jurisdiction
of the cause and the parties. So far as the Court pronouncing them had
jurisdiction, they are entitled in this Court to "full faith and credit;"
the jurisdiction of the Court only, and not the merits of the judgment
or decree are enquirable into.
The Defendants were made parties to the suit in Chancery in
South-Carolina, and so far as their rights were decided upon in that
decree, I hold it to be of the same conclusive character, as if pron-
ounced by a Chancery Court in this State; and that we are not permit-
ted, under the Constitution, and the Act of Congress giving effect to
it, to pronounce a different decree upon any of the rights of the parties
then brought into contestation. . . . Though the decree of the Court
of South-Carolina could only operate in personam, as to the land lying
in this State, yet now that this Court is called upon to carry that decree
into effect, they ought to do so, to the extent of jurisdiction possessed
'52Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 331-32, 317 P.2d II, 16 (1957).
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by the South-Carolina Court. After a minute examination of all the
cases on this subject, the result is thus expressed by the Supreme Court
of the United States; that in a case of fraud of trust or of contract, the
jurisidction of a Court of Chancery is sustainable wherever the person
be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that Court may
be affected by the decree.' m
The language of Chief Justice Taylor, shorn of its reference to full faith
and credit compulsion, presents a strong case for the voluntary recogni-
tion of sister-state equity decrees on the basis of res judicata.
In Barber v. Barber15 4 the Supreme Court held that alimony and
support decrees for past-due money payments are final money judgments
for full faith and credit purposes. In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Jackson indicated his belief that such a decree was entitled to full
faith and credit, even if it was not final. The constitutional mandate does
not go this far, but a second state with personal jurisdiction over the
defendant may adopt or modify a nonfinal decree of another state if it
sees fit to do so. Thus, in Worthley v. Worthley 5 5 suit was brought in
California not only to collect past-due separate maintenance but also to
have a New Jersey decree adopted as a California decree. The trial court
refused and the Supreme Court of California reversed. Its opinion, by
Justice Traynor, in part said:
Since the New Jersey decree is both prospectively and retroactively
modifiable . . . we are not constitutionally bound to enforce defen-
dant's obligations under it. . . . Nor are we bound not to enforce
them. . . . The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that
if such obligations are enforced in this state, at least as to accrued
arrearages, due process requires that the defendant be afforded an
opportunity to litigate the question of modification. . . . It has also
clearly indicated that as to either prospective or retroactive enforce-
ment of such obligations, this state "has at least as much leeway to
disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the
State where it was rendered." ....
. . . California courts will recognize and give prospective enforce-
ment to a foreign alimony decree, even though it is subject to modifica-
15 Picket v. Johns, 16 N.C. 123, 132-35 (1827) (Taylor, C.J., dissenting). Regarding a foreign
probate decree, see Groome v. Leatherwood, 240 N.C. 573, 83 S.E.2d 536 (1954); cf Monfils v.
Hazelwood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 312 U.S. 684 (1940).
154323 U.S. 77 (1944).
25544 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); accord, Herczog v. Herczog, 186 Cal. App. 2d 318, 9
Cal. Rptr. 5 (1960).
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tion under the law of the state where it was originally rendered, by
establishing it "as the decree of the California court with the same
force and effect as if it had been entered in this state, including punish-
ment for contempt if the defendant fails to comply."'
The court concluded:
[W]e hold that foreign-created alimony and support obligations
are enforceable in this state. In an action to enforce a modifiable
support obligation, either party may tender and litigate any plea for
modification that could be presented to the courts of the state where
the alimony or support decree was originally rendered."z7
North Carolina has clearly recognized the distinction between de-
crees for past-due unpaid alimony and decrees for future installments
subject to modification. In Willard v. Rodman " ' the supreme court held:
[U]nder the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the
United States, the plaintiff is entitled to a money judgment for the past
due and unpaid installments which had accrued under the Florida de-
cree at the time of the institution of this action. . . . Consequently, the
judgment entered below, in so far as it relates to past due and unpaid
installments, accruing under the Florida decree, will not be disturbed.
The full faith and credit clause in our Federal Constitution does
not obligate the courts of one state to enforce an alimony decree ren-
dered in another state, with respect to future installments, when such
future installments are subject to modification by the court of original
jurisdiction.
The court concluded that
the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment in this jurisdiction, directing the
defendant to pay future installments of alimony. She is entitled only
to a money judgment for past due and unpaid installments due her
under the Florida decree, which judgment is enforceable by execution
and not by contempt proceedings. . .. 9
In 1958 North Carolina adopted an open-door policy similar to
that of the Worthley case. In Thomas v. Thomas,6 0 where personal
'144 Cal. 2d at 468-69, 283 P.2d at 22.
1571d. at 474, 283 P.2d at 25.
1S233 N.C. 198,200-01, 63 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1951).
1111d. at 202, 63 S.E.2d at 109.
1-248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958).
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jurisdiction over the defendant father was obtained, the court held that
a modifiable Nevada decree for child support was res judicata as to the
issues litigated unless the wife could show such changed conditions and
circumstances as would justify an increase in the Nevada allowance.
However, if the wife were successful in pressing her claim, the full faith
and credit clause would not prevent a prospective modification of the
Nevada decree, since that decree was entitled to no greater effect outside
the state than it was within it."'
A forum court has judicial power to order persons before it to do
or not to do acts in sister states6 2 or foreign countries. 63 A forum court
may enjoin persons before it from instituting or prosecuting an action
in the courts of other states.' 6 ' Such injunctions traditionally have not
commanded full faith and credit in other states and have not been given
binding effect by courts in other jurisdictions.'65
The most recent Restatement of Confjicts adopts the speculative
view that since the United States Supreme Court has never passed on
the point, a sister-state judgment ordering or enjoining the doing of an
act other than the payment of money may be included within the full
faith and credit requirement.' 6 In arriving at this position, the reasoning
'Id. at 272. 103 S.E.2d at 373. Accord. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 237, 158 S.E.2d
77, 79 (1967); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401,406, 170 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1969).
'Madden v. Rosseter. 114 Misc. 416, 187 N.Y.S. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1921). In Madden the New
York court ordered defendant to deliver to plaintiff a race horse physically present in California.
The court observed: "The courts of sister States may be relied upon to aid in serving the ends of
justice whenever our own process falls short of effectiveness." Id. at - 187 N.Y.S. at 463.
'IUnited States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965). In this case the defendant New
York bank was enjoined from paying out funds on deposit in a customer's account in the Montevi-
deo, Uruguay branch of the bank.
United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The
response of the British courts to this effort to enforce United States antitrust law by requiring a
reconveyance of patent rights in England was to ignore it. Regarding this effort, Lord Justice
Denning, in British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] I Ch. 19 (1952)
said: "The writ of the United States does not run in this country, and, if due regard is had to the
comity of nations, it will not seek to run here." The United States constitutional full faith and credit
clause, of course, had no applicability to England.
"'James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 14 III. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
16Id.
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, Comment c at 307 (1971), observes
that the Supreme Court has not had occasion to determine whether such decrees must be enforced
by sister states. Arguments therein stated in favor of such enforceability are based on two points:
First, the full faith and credit clause speaks to "judicial proceedings" without limitation to money
judgments; second, a majority of state courts enforce sister-state judgments ordering the conveyance
of land.
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of the Restatement is remarkably similar to that used by Chief Justice
Taylor in his dissent in Picket v. Johns.'
North Carolina has defined the circumstances under which it will
enjoin litigation elsewhere. In Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes,6 ' the
court observed:
There are many cases that hold that courts of a State where both
parties are domiciled may restrain the prosecution of suits between
such parties in a foreign jurisdiction. . . . But even in such cases, the
power should be exercised sparingly and only to suppress manifest
injustice and oppression, and not from any arrogant sense of greater
ability to do justice to either party or because of more favorable laws,
or of convenience of the parties ...
But such powers cannot be exerted to enjoin parties who are not
domiciled in the jurisdiction of the court, merely on the ground that
the party has come into court by bringing an action herein.
In Evans v. Morrow' the North Carolina Supreme Court reiterated this
reluctance to enjoin the prosecution of litigation in other states. Despite
the fact that both parties were citizens of North Carolina, the court
declared that it devolved upon the plaintiff to establish an equity supe-
rior to the defendant's legal right to litigate elsewhere. The court then
listed the following examples of "inferior" equities:
1. A court of equity will not restrain a citizen from invoking the
aid of the courts of another state simply because it may be somewhat
more convenient or somewhat less expensive to his adversary to compel
him to carry on his litigation at home ...
2. A court of equity will not grant an injunction against an action
in another state on the ground that the rules of practice and procedure
in the state where the injunction is asked may differ from those which
obtain in the state where the action is brought ...
3. A court of equity will not enjoin judicial proceedings in the
court of another state through distrust of the competency of such court
to do justice in cases within its jurisdiction. 70
In Childress v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc.'7' the court expanded
upon these aforementioned principles.
1-16 N.C. 123 (1827). See text accompanying note 153 supra.
1-162 N.C. 46,48,77S.E. 1101 (1913).
169234 N.C. 600, 68 S.E.2d 258 (1951).
1701d. at 605, 68 S.E.2d at 261-62.
1'1235 N.C. 522. 531, 70 S.E.2d 558, 565 (1952).
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It is fundamental that a court of one state may not restrain the
prosecution of an action in a court of another state by order or decree
directed to the court or any of its officers ...
Nevertheless, it is well established that "a court . . . which has
uacquired jurisdiction of the parties, has power, on proper cause shown,
to enjoin them from proceeding with an action in another state ... .
particularly where such parties are citizens or residents of the state, or
with respect to a controversy between the same parties of which it
obtained jurisdiction prior to a foreign court."...
However, the rule is that this power of the court should be exer-
cised sparingly, and only where "a clear equity is presented requiring
the interposition of the court to prevent the manifest wrong and injus-
tice."
Instances where a plaintiff's equity would be deemed superior to the
defendant's right to litigate in another state were also enumerated in
Childress.
[A]n action or proceeding in another state ordinarily may be en-
joined where it is made to appear that its prosecution will interfere
unduly and inequitably with the progress of local litigation or with the
establishment of rights properly justiciable in the local court; or that
it is unduly annoying, vexatious, and harassing to the complainant, and
reasonably calculated to subject him to oppression or irreparable in-
jury. 172
Thus, in Thurston v. Thurston,173 the court, having personal juris-
diction over both parties, affirmed an order enjoining the defendant from
instituting a divorce action in any state other than North Carolina pend-
ing the final determination of the North Carolina action. In so doing,
the court observed:
"The plaintiff in a pending divorce action may, when jurisdiction over
the defendant has been obtained, be entitled to an order enjoining the
defendant from prosecuting a subsequent action for divorce in another
state before the former action is determined."
The order issued by Judge Copeland is not directed against any
foreign court. It is not directed against any official of such court. It is
directed only against the defendant in this action who has been person-
ally served with process in a proceeding involving the marital rights and
obligations of the parties whose domicile has been Wilson County since
I2ld.
M256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
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their marriage in 1935. The purpose of the order is to prevent the
defendant from going to a foreign jurisdiction and instituting an action
for absolute divorce requiring the plaintiff to contest the action if she
is able to find out where it is brought or compelling her to challenge
the judgment by overcoming its prima facie effect under the full failh
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. The defendant
should be required to set up and litigate in North Carolina any defense
he may have to the action pending here. . . . It would be inequitable
for the defendant to be permitted to delay the plaintiff's day in court
and defeat any just claim she may be able to establish by acquiring a
"quickie" divorce elsewhere.17 4
A different facet of the problem of restraining the prosecution of
an action in another state is provided by Amos v. Southern Railway
Co.1 75 In Amos the plaintiff, a resident of North Carolina, instituted an
action in a Missouri state court under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act for injuries incurred in the course of his railroad employment in
North Carolina. Later he filed an identical suit in North Carolina.
Despite the fact that the defendant would not have been entitled to
restrain the plaintiff from suing in Missouri in the first instance, the
court held that the plaintiff's subsequent filing in North Carolina enti-
tled the defendant to a restraining order for as long as the plaintiff
continued to invoke the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts.'76
From these authorities it is manifest that the power of North Caro-
lina courts to enjoin litigation elsewhere rests within their wide equity
74
Id. at 668-69, 124 S.E.2d at 855.
175237 N.C. 714,75 S.E.2d 908 (1953).
171d. at 718, 75 S.E.2d at 912.
However, in Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 29 (1876), without inquiring into the residence of
the parties, the court refused to bar a counterclaim in a North Carolina suit, because of a prior
pending suit on the same cause of action between the same parties in a federal court in Georgia.
The court said:
The provision . . . allowing as cause for demurrer that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause must be confined to the Courts of
the State, where the remedies are precisely the same; the object being to protect parties
from vexation and the Courts from multiplicity of suits. But in different States or
governments the remedies are not the same, and there may be reasons why our courts
should not take notice of proceedings outside of the State which would not be applicable
to our own Courts.
Id. at 33. Thus it was held that a "race to judgment" was permissable.
Where two identical actions between the same parties are pending in different North Carolina
courts, normally the second in point of time will be dismissed on motion, or by the court ex mero
motu. Jones Constr. Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., 190 N.C. 580, 130 S.E. 165 (1925).
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discretion. It is also apparent that this power is sparingly used and that
the supreme court is reluctant to reverse trial court determinations.
Finally, although the power is not expressly couched in terms of forum
non conveniens, such an approach is in fact used to a substantial extent
to guide the discretion of the courts. Perhaps, similar broad equitable
principles might apply where the act sought to be restrained in another
state did not involve foreign litigation.
77
Apparently North Carolina has not expressly ruled on the efficacy
of an out-of-state injunction seeking to halt litigation pending in North
Carolina courts. However, from the holding of the majority in Picket v.
Johns7 " and from the language used in Thurston v. Thurston, 79 it seems
clear that binding effect would not be given to such a decree. On the
other hand, the out-of-state injunction might be treated as a factor to
be considered by the North Carolina court in determining the equities
between the parties. Specifically, it might bear upon the issue of whether
a stay of proceedings or a forum non conveniens dismissal might be
appropriate.
14. Status Determinations
Status determinations judicially declared elsewhere are, as a matter
of practice, usually accorded full faith and credit in sister states.' How-
ever, this is not normally required by federal mandate. It has been
expressly held that full faith and credit is not obligatory upon other
'"See note 162 supra.
17816 N.C. 123 (1827). See text accompanying note 153 supra.
172256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962). See text accompanying note 173 supra.
lThe child will usually be held legitimate if this would be his status under the local law
of the state where either (a) the parent was domiciled when the child's status of legiti-
macy is claimed to have been created or (b) the child was domiciled when the parent
acknowledged the child as his own.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287(2) (1971).
A state usually gives the same incidents to a status of legitimacy created by a foreign
law under the principles stated in § 287 that it gives to the status when created by its
own local law.
Id. § 288.
An adoption rendered in a state having judicial jurisdiction under the rule of § 78 will
usually be given the same effect in another state as is given by the other state to a decree
of adoption rendered by its own courts.
Id. § 290.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (1942) states:
(1) In a proceeding in rem with respect to a status the judgment is conclusive upon
all persons as to the existence of the status.
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states as to adoption""1 or legitimation decrees.12 On the other hand, it
has been federally determined that custody decrees must be given full
faith and credit by sister states until there is a showing of a change of
circumstances that affects the interests of the child. In Kovacs v.
Brewer'13 the United States Supreme Court reversed a North Carolina
custody decree that disregarded an earlier Virginia custody decree and
remanded for a determination by the North Carolina courts of whether
there had been such a change of circumstances after the entry of the
Virginia decree. The North Carolina court tersely stated:
The child was adopted according to the law of Virginia and we must
give under the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, section 1, "full faith and
credit." This case is controlled not by the statutes and decisions of this
State, but according to the laws of Virginia, in which state the judg-
ment was rendered and we must give under the Constitution "full faith
and credit" to same.' u
A North Carolina statute requires that "[a] child, adopted. . . in
accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction . . . [is]
entitled by succession to any property . . . from his adoptive parents
. . . the same as if he were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive
parents."'81 5 Another requires that "[a] child . . . who shall have been
(2) A judgment in such a proceeding will not bind anyone personally unless the
court has jurisdiction over him, and it is not conclusive as to a fact upon which the
judgment is based except between persons who have actually litigated the question of the
existence of the fact.
181Hood v. MeGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915). Possibly, this case simply accords supremacy with
respect to interests in realty to the law of the situs of the land in which children adopted elsewhere
claim an interest. See Anderson v. French, 77 N.H. 509, 93 A. 1042 (1915). The majority opinion
in part says:
The legality of the adoption is decided by the law of the state where the adoption took
place; but that relation or status having been established, what the adopted child shall
inherit should be determined in the case of personalty by the lex domicilii of the owner
at the time of his decease, and real estate by the lex rei sitae [at the date of death].
Id. at 511,93 A. at 1043.
'8 3Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386 (1910). 1 n Olmstead it was held that a New York court
was not required to give full faith and credit to a Michigan statute that legitimated children whose
parents subsequently married. But cf. McNamara v. McNamara, 303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 410 (1922).
In McNamara the Illinois court recognized a California judgment which held that a natural son
had been legitimated by recognition by the father in California. Despite the fact that the methods
of legitimation differed in California and Illinois, the court declared that the public policy underly-
ing the result in the two states was the same. Hence, the California judgment would be enforced.
1 356 U.S. 604 (1958), vacating and remanding 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957). For a
discussion of this case in a choice of law context, see Wurfel, supra note I, at 301.
""*In re Osborne, 205 N.C. 716,719, 172 S.E. 491,492 (1933).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17(a) (1966).
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legitimated in accordance with . . . the applicable law of any other
jurisdiction [is] . . . entitled by succession to property . . . from his
father and mother. . . the same as if born in lawful wedlock. .... ,,186
An adoption decree, foreign or domestic, is subject to collateral
attack if the court granting it did not have personal jurisdiction of the
necessary parties. In Truelove v. Parker'8 7 a purported adopted daughter
was held not entitled to inherit from an adopting parent when her natural
parents had not been made parties to the proceedings. The court rea-
soned:
[N]either the father nor the mother of Irma Johnson was a party to
the adoption proceeding . . and . . the clerk had no jurisdiction of
their person. Having no jurisdiction of their person he had no jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter: Consent is essential to the order of adoption
• . . and when the statute requires it to be given jurisdiction of the
subject-matter cannot be acquired without it. Im
In North Carolina legitimacy is a status and accompanies the child
wherever he goes. In Fowler v. Fowler"8 9 the court held that it was
obliged to recognize the legitimacy of a child whose parents had married
in Illinois. Even though the laws of North Carolina did not then provide
for the legitimation of children by the subsequent marriage of their
parents, the court held that "[t]he parties were domiciled, according to
the complaint, at the time of the child's birth and up to the time of the
marriage, in Illinois, and it is well settled that the child, being still a
minor, its legitimacy then accrued and accompanies it wherever it
goes." 1o
Since 1917 a North Carolina statute has provided that the subse-
quent marriage of the parents legitimates their child and gives him all
rights of descent and distribution as though he had been born in lawful
wedlock. 9' Under this statute, when such marriage occurred after the
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-18 (1966).
'191 N.C. 430, 132 S.E. 295 (1926). Truelove was cited and followed in In re Shelton, 203
N.C. 75, 164 S.E. 332 (1926), when the mother who had not been made a party to the purported
adoption was held in a habeas corpus proceeding to be entitled to the custody of her illegitimate
child.
'191 N.C. at 439, 132 S.E. at 299.
189131 N.C. 169, 42 S.E. 563 (1902); Comment, Domestic Relations-Illegitimacy in North
Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REv. 813 (1968).
1"131 N.C. at 171, 42 S.E. at 564. In dealing with statutory proceedings in other states it is
important to determine precisely what status is thereby conferred, since it is that status that will
be recognized elsewhere. See Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12 (1966). Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961).
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mother had consented to an adoption of the child, it was held that this
marriage changed his status so as to render him ineligible for adop-
tion.1 2 This result has been changed by subsequent statutes that provide
that under these circumstances the consent of the father is not necessary
and the adoption may proceed." 3
The North Carolina rule regarding the recognition of foreign cus-
tody decrees complies with the federal mandate of Kovacs v. Brewer that
they must be given full faith and credit until a change in circumstances
is alleged and proved but that upon such showing the original custody
award may be changed. 14 Evidence of such change is usually available.
The basic rule that a marriage valid where performed will be recog-
nized elsewhere9 5 is the law in North Carolina. This is so, at least as to
persons who were nonresidents at the time of the marriage, even if the
marriage is not one that would be valid if performed in North Carolina.
Thus, a marriage of a black and a white in South Carolina, then valid
in South Carolina, was upheld at a time when such a marriage was void
in North Carolina."'6 Moreover, a common law marriage entered into
in South Carolina has been recognized in North Carolina, although
North Carolina domestic law does not recognize common law mar-
riages. 917
Recognition of foreign divorces and their effect on status has been
discussed in a separate article.'
15. In Rem and Quasi in Rein Proceedings
Status determinations and, on occasion, support decrees are re-
ferred to as being in rem. 9 Since status has been separately considered,
121n re Adoption of Doe, 231 N.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 8 (1949).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-6(a), 49-13.1 (Supp. 1969).
"'In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966), discussed in Wurfel, Conflict oJ Laws,
Survey of N.C. Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REV. 842, 848 (1967). See note 183 and accompanying text
supra.
1"5RESTATENIENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) states:
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and
the marriage.
"'State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877).
"'Harris v. Harris, 257 N.C. 416, 126 S.E.2d 83 (1962).
1'1Wurfel 294-97.
"'Hoskins v. Currin, 242 N.C. 432, 438, 88 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1955). "An action which relates
to the custody of a child is in the nature of an in rei proceedings [sic]. Therefore, the child is the
res over which the court must have jurisdiction before it may enter a valid and enforceable order."
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the focus of this section will be on other in rem and quasi in rem
proceedings.
A lucid discussion of the distinction between actions in personam,
in rem, and quasi in rem appears in Bernhardt v. Brown. 21'" The court
said:
-Due process of law" requires that service of process shall always
be made. There are three modes in which this can be done.
I. By actual service (or, in lieu thereof, acceptance of service or a
waiver of service by an appearance in the action) ....
2. By publication of summons in cases in which it is authorized
by law, in proceedings in rein. In these cases the Court already has
jurisdiction of the res, as to enforce some lien or a partition of property
in its control, or the like, and the judgment has no personal force, not
even for the costs being limited to acting upon the property.
3. By publication of the summons, in cases authorized by law, in
proceedings quasi in rein. In those cases the court acquires jurisdiction
by attaching property of a nonresident or of an absconding debtor, and
in similar cases, and the judgment has no personal efficiency, extending
no farther than its enforcement out of the property seized by attach-
ment.
. . . In proceedings . . . in rein . . . it is not necessary, as in
proceedings quasi in rein, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or
Accord, Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948). Cf MeRary v. McRary. 228 N.C.
714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948).
Surratt v. Surratt, 263 N.C. 466, 139 S.E.2d 720 (1965) said:
The sole question . . . is whether or not a wife may institute an action for the
custody, support and maintenance of the minor children born of the marriage, and for
alimony without divorce, and procure an in personati judgment against her defendant
husband by service of process on her non-resident husband outside the State, pursuant
to the provisions of G.S. 1-104. The answer must be in the negative.
Id. at 468, 139 S.E.2d at 722.
We hold . . . the defendant was a nonresident of North Carolina at the time service
of process was made upon him outside the State and that the judgment entered against
the defendant . . . was not a judgment in personain, and that the orders adjudging the
defendant in contempt for failing to comply therewith were improvidently entered and
are hereby reversed and set aside.
Id. at 470, 139 S.E.2d at 723. See Church v. Miller, 260 N.C. 331, 132 S.E.2d 688 (1963); Burton
v. Dixon, 259 N.C. 473, 131 S.E.2d 27 (1963); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
CY. Walton v. Walton, 178 N.C. 73, 100 S.E. 176 (1919), in which the court upheld an
attachment of the defendant's property to secure a judgment for subsistence when finally rendered.
The court held that the statute granting subsistence to a wife who had been abandoned provided a
remedy in rem, as well as in personam, and that attachment served both to secure the property
pending Final judgment and to provide a basis for service by publication.
See RESTATEMEINT OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (1942).
-118 N.C. 700, 24 S.E. 527 (1896); accord, Stevens v. Cecil, 214 N.C. 217, 199 S.E. 161
(1938).
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attachment of the property, but "it may be done by the mere bringing
of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law
...is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of
dominion over it for the purposes of the suit." '01
In Bernhardt there had been no personal service, either in or out-
of-state, on the nonresident corporate defendant. It was held that a
parcel of land subject to a mechanic's lien passed to the purchaser at an
execution sale, even though there had been no previous attachment by
the lienor. However, as to three other parcels of land that were sold on
execution to satisfy a judgment for money claims not protected by a lien
and when there had been no prior attachment, it was held that the
interest of the non-resident defendant had not been extinguished and that
a subsequent judgment creditor in a suit commenced by personal service
prevailed. This case was decided long before the day of widened personal
jurisdiction under long-arm statutes, but its definitions of in rem and
quasi in rem actions continue to be valid. 2 '
In Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co. 0 3 suit was brought in North
Carolina to recover damages for breach of warranty as to the quality of
guano purchased from a Virginia vendor. Previously, after attaching the
plaintiff's cotton in Virginia, the vendor had sued the plaintiff there and
had recovered one hundred thirty dollars of the unpaid purchase price.
In the North Carolina case, the plaintiff was awarded this same one
hundred thirty dollars plus another seventy-two dollars "actual dam-
ages." In modifying this judgment on appeal to seventy-two dollars, the
court observed that the Virginia judgment was conclusive on the issue
of the debt to the extent of the value of the property attached (130
dollars). Consequently, to allow the plaintiff to recover that sum would
211118 N.C. at 705-06, 24 S.E. at 528. See Mangum, Mechanics' Liens in North Carolina, 41
N.C.L. REV. 173 (1963); cf. Rutherford v. Ray, 147 N.C. 253, 61 S.E. 57 (1908).
111RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 73 (1942) provides:
(I) In a proceeding in rem with respect to a thing the judgment is conclusive upon
all persons as to interests in the thing.
(2) A judgment in such a proceeding will not bind anyone personally unless the
court has jurisdiction over him, and it is not conclusive as to a fact upon which the
judgment is based except between persons who have actually litigated the question of the
existence of the fact.
Sections 75-76 contain comparable provisions regarding judgments quasi in rem and proceedings
begun by attachment or garnishment. For an example of the rule contained in section 73(l), see
Corpening v. Kincaid, 82 N.C. 202 (1880).
=77 N.C. 233 (1877).
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be equivalent to reversing the Virginia judgment, thereby denying it the
full faith and credit to which it was due.
204
in Smith v. Gordon,2 5 suit was brought in North Carolina on a
West Virginia quasi in rem judgment that had been obtained by attach-
ment proceedings in the absence of the defendant. The North Carolina
suit was filed more than three years after the debt in West Virginia
became due. The trial court held that the three-year statute of limitations
on contract obligations, and not the ten-year statute on judgments, was
applicable. In affirming the judgment for the defendant, the court cited
Peebles for the proposition that the West Virginia judgment was merely
conclusive evidence of the validity of the debt to the extent of the value
of the property attached. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit had to be
based upon the debt itself rather than the judgment upon the debt.
2
11
Facts determined in an in rem proceeding are not res judicata in
other litigation as to parties not brought within the in personamjurisdic-
tion of the first court. This principle is illustrated by Cannon v.
Cannon. 17 In Cannon suit had been brought to construe a will as to the
point in time when the value of certain annuities should be determined
and when their payment should be commenced. The testatrix had
previously established a revocable trust with a New York bank as trus-
tee. The same persons were beneficiaries under both the will and the
trust. The trustee had brought an earlier action in New York to deter-
mine the same questions regarding the annuities under the trust in which
only one of the beneficiaries was personally served. This New York
decree was pleaded as binding in the North Carolina action and was so
treated by the trial court. The supreme court reversed, saying:
No incidental construction of the trust agreement for the purpose of
its administration could have any in rem effect on the will or any in
personaim effect on its beneficiaries. Considered within the framework
of such a proceeding, a fact found as an inducement to a conclusion
with respect to the rem would not necessarily estop a party to another
collateral proceeding where the fact is more directly involved, as that
would make the judgment in rem operate as a judgment in
personam . "A judgment in rem binds all the world, but the facts
=1Id. at 237-38.
-204 N.C. 695, 169 S.E. 634 (1933). Subsequently, Smith was cited with approval by Judge
Augustus Hand in McQuillen v. Dillon, 98 F.2d 726, 729 (2d. Cir. 1938).
-204 N.C. 695, 697, 169 S.E. 634, 635 (1933).
-223 N.C. 664, 28 S.E.2d 240 (1943).
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on which it necessarily proceeds are not established against all the
world." 20
In Harris v. Upham209 suit was brought by a resident of South
Carolina against a resident of the District of Columbia for specific
performance of a contract to convey North Carolina land. Although
notice was given by substituted service, the action was held to be in rem,
thereby giving the court jurisdiction to vest title to the land without prior
attachment.210 This in rem jurisdiction, however, is not completely un-
limited. Thus, it has been held that in a proceeding under the Torrens
system, the North Carolina court was without jurisdiction to render a
judgment vesting title to lands covered by navigable waters in a private
owner.
21'
In an action quasi in rem against a nonresident defendant on a
cause of action not covered by the long-arm statute, it is necessary to a
valid service of process by publication that the defendant have property
in the state and that such property be actually attached.2 12 It has been
held that title to tobacco warehoused in North Carolina, the negotiable
warehouse receipts for which were attached in New York and under
court compulsion there indorsed by the necessary parties, passed under
the judgment of the New York court.21 3
In Lane Trucking Company v. Haponski214 on substituted service
of process the North Carolina trial court issued an order permanently
enjoining the defendant in Florida from exercising control over property
of the plaintiff located in Florida and refused to dismiss the proceeding
on defendant's special appearance to contest jurisdiction. Upon defen-
dant's failure to comply with the decree, the court cited him for con-
tempt. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that an
injunction is an equitable remedy to be exercised in personam and not
in rem.2
15
=Id. at 670-71, 28 S.E.2d at 244.
2-244 N.C. 477,94 S.E.2d 370 (1956).
2"Attachment would be necessary if the suit involved matters aside from the land
itself. But where the controversy involves the title to or interest in land, the bringing of
the action in the jurisdiction where the land lies is sufficient to enable the court to exercise
dominion over it.
Id. at 478, 94 S.E.2d at 372.
2'Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954).
21Stevens v. Cecil, 214 N.C. 217, 199 S.E. 161 (1938).
2'213 Webb v. Friedberg, 189 N.C. 166, 126 S.E. 508 (1925).
21260 N.C. 514, 133 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
215d. at 516, 133 S.E.2d at 194.
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According full faith and credit to challenged in rem and quasi in
rem judgments of sister states involves two steps: first, the court must
ascertain whether the requirements of the judgment state for the exercise
of such jurisdiction were present; secondly, it must determine whether
federal due process requirements were satisfied by the state requirements.
If these prerequisites are met, then the sister-state judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit, but only as to its effect on the res upon which it
operates.
II. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS
Research efforts have failed to disclose a North Carolina decision
dealing expressly with the treatment to be accorded to a foreign country
judgment, as distinguished from a judgment of a sister state. However,
at least two early dicta pronouncements are available. In an 1827 dissent
dealing with a South Carolina probate decree, Chief Justice Taylor said
obiter:
If the assistance of this Court were sought to effectuate a decree
of a foreign Court of Chancery, the merits of it would be open to
examination, and we should be convinced of its justice and propriety,
before we proceeded. Like a foreign judgment at law, it would be but
primafacie evidence of the justice of the demand.
216
Following this statement seventy-three years elapsed before the
court again spoke on the question of recognition of foreign-country
judgments. Arrington v. Arrington 17 contains this dictum: "Whatever
regard for [foreign nation judicial proceedings] has been shown is the
result of treaty, or mere comity.
'2 1 1
Since the full faith and credit mandate of the Federal Constitution
does not apply to foreign-country judgments, the issue of their recogni-
tion rests entirely in comity.2 19 Three views on this subject are possible:
(1) no recognition will be given to the judgment of a foreign country
26Picket v. Johns, 16 N.C. 123, 132 (1827).
217127 N.C. 190, 37 S.E. 212 (1900).
2181d. at 193, 37 S.E. at 213.
t9lhe Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) said:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
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unless a treaty between the two nations concerned expressly provides for
such recognition; (2) recognition will be extended on a basis of reciproc-
ity; and (3) recognition will be accorded in all cases without regard to
reciprocal treatment being extended by the law of the judgment nation.
The first view is the rule in France and a few other civil law countries.22
The second is the federal rule as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Hilton v. Guyot,221 and the third is the New York conflict of laws rule
on the point. 22
2"See Denton & Hall v. Bouillon, [1873] Sirey Recueil General II. 18 (Court of Appeal,
Toulouse). This case affirmed the duty of the French court to review on the merits an English
judgment rendered by the Court of Exchequer for attorneys' fees. M. KATZ & K. BREWSTiR,
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 446 (1960), contains the
following translated excerpt from the opinion in Denton & Hall:
[T]o judge is to know, to verify, and to decide after a full examination of the case.
"Considering, moreover, that the doctrine of the right of review is consistent with
the structure of our legal system; that Article 14 (of the Civil Code), which allows a
French national to summon a foreigner before a French court and which therefore
departs from the rule of the law of nations actor sequiturforum rei, is stamped with the
mistrust of foreign justice that is embedded in our laws, and that it would be contradic-
tory to hold that it was intended that the protection granted to French nationals by
Article 14 be withdrawn by Article 2123 and that they be subject to foreign judgments
without the guarantee accorded by review; that it must after all be recognized that the
complete guarantees offered by the French judicial system are not offered by the judicial
systems of all other countries of the world, nor even of all countries of Europe ....
[ . . ITihe right . . . belongs to the sovereign to grant res judicata effect to foreign
judgments by treaties based on an agreed reciprocity [.] . . . [Imn face of the conflict of
contrary opinions as to the effect of foreign judgments in France, the controlling and
decisive consideration must be that the resjudicata effect of foreign judgments cannot
cross the frontiers of the sovereignty from which they issue ....
But see Charr v. Hasim Ulusahim, [1956] Reccuils Dalloz of Surey, Jurisprudence 61, Paris
Ct. of App. (Ist Ch.), noted in Nadlemann, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments in France,
5 AM. J. ComP. L. 248 (1956).
See also Nadlemann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and
More to Go, 13 Ai. J. Comp. L. 72 (1964). Due to the civil law doctrine that judicial decisions do
not generally constitute legal precedent, it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion. Many of those
coiIcerned proceed on the assumption that the pronouncement in Denton & Hall continues to be
the French rule. There is no treaty between France and the United States regarding recognition of
the judgments of their respective courts.
-1159 U.S. 113 (1895); accord, Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952), noted in
38 CORN. L.Q. 423 (1953) (lack of reciprocity must be pleaded by the party seeking to avoid the
conclusive effect of the foreign judgment).
On the same day it decided Hilton, the Supreme Court in Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235
(1895), enforced an Ontario judgment without an examination of its merits, since Ontario would
give conclusive effect to a United States court judgment.
t Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926);
Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284 (1927), affd per
curiam, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927). In Cowans a Quebec judgment was given conclusive
effect, even though the law of Quebec did not give recognition to foreign judgments. See Watts v.
Swiss Bank, 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970). "Under the principles of
comity the courts should give full effect to a judgment rendered by a French court of competent
jurisdiction." Id. at 279, 265 N.E.2d at 744, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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The 122 pages of argument and opinions in Hilton contain a num-
ber of propositions that are undoubtedly good law. These include:
Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to
any effect, must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the cause, and upon regular proceedings and due notice. In alluding to
different kinds of judgments, therefore, such jurisdiction, proceedings
and notice will be assumed. It will also be assumed that they are
untainted by fraud . ...
A judgment in rein, adjudicating the title to a ship or other mova-
ble property within the custody of the court, is treated as valid every-
where ...
A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree con-
firming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every coun-
try, unless contrary to the policy of its own law ...
* . . [A] judgment in foreign attachment is conclusive, as between
the parties, of the right to the property or money attached ...
Other foreign judgments which have been held conclusive of the
matters adjudged were judgments discharging obligations contracted in
the foreign country between citizens or residents thereof. . . .221
The Court continued:
The extraterritorial effect of judgments in personam, at law or in
equity, may differ, according to the parties to the cause. A judgment
of that kind between two citizens or residents of the country, and
thereby subject to the jurisdiction, in which it is rendered, may be held
conclusive as between them everywhere. So, if a foreigner invokes the
jurisdiction by bringing an action against a citizen, both may be held
bound by a judgment in favor of either. And if a citizen sues a for-
eigner, and judgment is rendered in favor of the latter, both may be
held equally bound .
22
The Supreme Court summarized its holding in Hilton as follows:
[J]udgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by
the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits,
are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in
this country, but are prima ficie evidence only of the justice of the
plaintiffs' claim.
. . . [W]e do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one
person by reason of injustice done to another; but upon the broad
221159 U.S. at 166-68.
211d. at 170.
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ground that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciproc-
ity. . 225
The Restatement of Conflicts shrinks Hilton in its comments
thereon in this manner:
In Hilton v. Guyot . . . the Supreme Court of the United States held
in a 5-4 decision that in one isolated situation a judgment rendered in
a foreign nation would be subjected by the federal courts in this country
to a reexamination on the merits if an American judgment would be
given similar treatment in the foreign nation involved. This situation
is where a citizen or resident of the foreign nation brings the suit there
against a foreigner and obtains a judgment in his favor.226
The rule laid down by the Restatement essentially embraces the New
York rule. It provides: "A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation
after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the
United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause
of action are concerned."
22 7
Hilton, decided in 1895, came long before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"',
and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 22  These deci-
sions now require federal courts in diversity cases to apply the conflict
of laws rules of the state in which they are sitting. Whether Erie here
applies or the treatment to be accorded to a foreign country judgment
is so essentially a part of international relations as to present a federal
question to be determined by federal law is considered in two federal
district court decisions. The first was a case in which a Swedish bank
brought a diversity suit in Massachusetts against a Massachusetts resi-
dent to recover on a Swedish judgment. In Svenska Handelsbanken v.
Carlson,30 the court held that Erie governed and that, as a result, the
rule to be applied was that of the state in which it sat. In this case the
state rule only accorded the foreign judgment prima facie effect as to
proof of the underlying claim. A like result was subsequently reached in
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,231 a diversity ac-
2id. at 227-28.
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment e at 299-300 (197 1).
-mId. § 98.
-304 U.S. 64 (1938).
=313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966). "[M]assachusetts, rather than federal law seems to be
properly applicable here. . . . There is no [Massachusetts] decision that would support giving a
conclusive effect to the Swedish judgment. ... Id. at 450-5 .
21318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970). This case is pending appeal in the circuit court.
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tion brought in Pennsylvania to enforce a default judgment obtained in
England. The district court first found, from a complicated set of proce-
dural facts, that the defendant corporation had entered a general appear-
ance in the English court and had thereafter defaulted on the merits. It
then cited Erie, Klaxon Co., and Svenska Handelsbanken and held:
"The issue of whether or not a foreign judgment will be enforced by a
federal district court, having jurisdiction by means of diversity, is
governed by the law of the state where the federal court is located." 2
Regarding reciprocity, the court in Somportex found that if presented
with the issue the Pennsylvania courts would refuse to follow Hilton and
would enforce the English judgment without regard to reciprocity. 233 The
Supreme Court has not yet decided the point. However, it seems proba-
ble that an applicable treaty dealing with judgment recognition would
present a federal question which would preempt state law.
Any of the three rules regarding recognition could conceivably be
adopted by North Carolina in the absence of a treaty between the United
States and the country concerned which expressly required recognition.
Adoption of the severe French view seems unlikely. The requirement of
reciprocity in the limited factual circumstances found in Hilton is a
possibility and would be consistent with the langauge of the two North
Carolina dicta. This view has not been favored by most legal writers, 2 4
=id. at 164.
in support of this holding the court said:
[Wle do not find the teaching of Hilton on reciprocity to be controlling in this case. The
Hilton decision was a pre Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins case and it has never been suggested
that it was constitutionally dictated and therefore binding on the states. It is clear...
that the law governing the enforceability of foreign judgments by a federal court is the
law of the state where the court is located. Therefore, the issue, as this Court perceives
it, is whether the courts of Pennsylvania would hold that reciprocity is a necessary
precondition to the enforcement of foreign judgments ...
• . . The Court finds that the concept of reciprocity is a provincial one, one which
fosters decisions that do violence to the legitimate goals of comity between foreign
nations. Therefore, absent a positive showing that Pennsylvania would follow the Hilton
decision with respect to reciprocity. this Court will not presume that it would adhere to
such an undermined concept. This Court finds that if presented with the issue, the
Pennsylvania courts would follow its neighboring state of New York and expressly reject
this concept.
Id. at 167-68.
2Lorenzen, The Enjbrcenent of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YAtLE L.J. 188 (1919);
Nadelmann, Reprisals Against Anterican Judgments, 65 HARV. L. Ri-v. 1184 (1952); Nadelmann,
Non-Recognition ofAnerican Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 IowA L.
Ri.v. 236 (1953); Nadelmann, The United States of Anerica and Agreements of Reciprocal En-
Jorcentent of Foreign Judgments, I NIiTH. INT'l. L. Rliv. 156 (1953); Reese, The Status in This
Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. Riv. 783 (1950); Note, The Enforceability
of Foreign Judgments in American Courts, 37 NOTRi DAMl LAW. 88 (1961).
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but in the international community there is merit to the reciprocity
concept that the golden rule should cut both ways. Finally, North Caro-
lina could follow the New York conflicts rule that if the jurisdictional
foundation upon which the foreign-country judgment is based is not
successfully attacked,2 it will be given full credit in the forum without
review of the merits.
Prophecy as to which solution will ultimately be adopted in North
Carolina would be sheer speculation, and occasion to resolve the ques-
tion seems to be slow in coming. If the established period of seventy-
three years between dicta on the point remains constant, another North
Carolina obiter statement may be anticipated in 1973.
231ln determining the sufficiency of the jurisdictional foundation for a foreign country judg-
ment, American courts tend to apply their own jurisdictional standards and United States constitu-
tional concepts of due process of law. See Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958),
discussed in Comment, Mexican Divorces: Are They Recognized in California?, 4 Cal. W.L. Rev.
341, 349 (1968).
